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THESIS

**SWITZERLAND AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS**

by

Peter Candidus Stocker

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Thesis Advisor:

Donald Abenheim

Second Reader:

Bert Patenaude

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**SWITZERLAND AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL
SECURITY INSTITUTIONS**

Peter Candidus Stocker
Lieutenant Colonel GS, Swiss Army
Ph.D., University of Zurich, 1987


Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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
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


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
Approved by:



Donald Abenheim, Thesis Advisor



Bertrand M. Patenaude, Second Reader



Frank C. Petho, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

Switzerland was a member of the League of Nations, but has never joined the United Nations. Switzerland nonetheless works closely with the UN, and the Swiss are active in the OSCE. The Swiss never tried to join NATO, but there is a growing engagement in the PfP program. Switzerland is an island surrounded by the European Union, and still resists membership. The Swiss Government wants to join the United Nations and the European Union, but the Swiss public, in 1986 and in 1992, said "no" to such entries, because it wants to remain neutral and to keep its political rights.

The thesis examines the proposition that the new policy of "Security through Cooperation," as written in several governmental reports, is compatible with Swiss neutrality, and therefore examines Swiss history, the country's system, and its relationship to the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EU. In every step, where the Swiss Government follows the Swiss history of the Good Offices, the Swiss public says "yes," in all other steps "no." The thesis shows the reasons for this development.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	THE SWISS SYSTEM	7
A.	DEMOCRACY: FROM THE FIRST LETTER OF FREEDOM IN 1291 TO THE 2000 CONSTITUTION.....	7
B.	SWISS NEUTRALITY	11
C.	THE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY	14
1.	Swiss Foreign Policy After World War II Until the Cold War	14
2.	The Foreign Policy Principles in the Beginning of the 21 st Century: The White Papers on Swiss Integration Policy	16
3.	From the Report 1990 on Swiss Security Policy to the Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy	18
a)	Report 1990 on Swiss Security Policy	18
b)	Report of the Study Commission on Strategic Issues (Brunner Commission, 1998).....	18
c)	Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy	20
d)	The Swiss Military System.....	20
e)	The Swiss Military Law: An Obstacle for Future Military Engagements Abroad?	21
III.	SWITZERLAND: NON-MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT ACHIEVING AND PAYING MORE THAN OTHERS	23
A.	SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS: FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO THE 21 ST CENTURY ..	23
1.	From 1920 to the Swiss Ballot in 1986	23
2.	From the Ballot in 1986 to Possible Swiss UN Membership in the First Decade of the 21 st Century: Discrepancy between Observer Status and Achievements.....	24
B.	GENEVA, A SWISS TOWN, AS THE "CENTER OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATIONS"	27
1.	Geneva, an International City.....	27
2.	A New Swiss Foundation: The International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)	28
C.	THE SWISS ENGAGEMENT IN THREE UN ORGANIZATIONS REGARDING JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL.....	29
D.	THE SWISS BLUE BERETS AND OTHER SWISS CITIZENS ABROAD IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS	30
1.	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (NNSC): Switzerland Engaged as a Neutral Country from 1953 to the 21 st Century.....	30
2.	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG): The Swiss Medical Unit 1989-1990	31
3.	Missions des Nations Unie Pour le Referendum au Sahara Occidental(MINURSO): Swiss Medical Unit 1991-1994	32
4.	Operation "ALBA" in Support of the United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees (UNHCR).....	32
5.	Swiss Engagements in UNMOT, UNTSO, UNOMIG, UNMOP, UNMIK, UNMIA, UNDP.....	33
6.	The Swiss Atomic-Chemical Laboratory Spiez(AC-Labor in Spiez).....	34
7.	Swiss People Engaged by the UN	35
E.	THE SWISS BALLOTS DEALING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS	36
1.	Swiss Ballot in 1986: UN Membership.....	36
2.	Swiss Ballot in 1994: Creation of Swiss Troops for Peace-Supporting Operations (Blue Helmet Troops).....	38
3.	Swiss Initiative to Join the UN in the 21 st Century.....	41

IV. SWITZERLAND AS FULL MEMBER OF THE OSCE	47
A. SWITZERLAND AND THE OSCE: HISTORY AND GOALS	47
1. Swiss Policy from World War II to 1975: The Path of Switzerland to Helsinki	47
2. From the CSCE to the OSCE	52
B. TWO ASPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE OSCE	54
1. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration	54
2. The OSCE within the Architecture of Security in Europe and the World: a Regional Arrangement of the United Nations	55
C. SWITZERLAND AS CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE OF THE OSCE IN 1996	56
1. The Swiss Goals and the Reality	56
2. The Long-Term Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	58
3. The Long-Term Mission in Chechnya	60
D. THE DUTIES AND WORKING METHODS OF THE OSCE: AN EXAMPLE OF SWISS ENGAGEMENT IN 1998	62
1. Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management	62
2. The Human Dimension	63
3. Arms Control, Disarmament, Confidence- and Security Building	64
E. THE OSCE ON THE WAY TO THE 21ST CENTURY: THE SWISS ENGAGEMENT – THE CHARTER FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY – THE CHECHNYA CONFLICT	65
V. SWITZERLAND ON THE WAY TO NATO?	69
A. PfP	69
1. Switzerland and PfP: From 1993 to 1996	69
2. The Swiss Participation in PfP: The Presentation Document and the Swiss Organization	73
a) The Presentation Document	73
b) The Swiss Organization and the Development of PfP After 1996	76
B. THE SWISS ENGAGEMENT	79
1. The IPPs and their Realization: 1997-2001	79
a) 1997, the First Year with PfP	79
b) 1998, the First Year of Consolidation	80
c) 1999, an Important Year for Swiss Security Policy and for Participation in PfP	81
d) 2000 to 2001	82
2. The Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SPN), Switzerland and PfP, Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSA)	84
3. Geneva: Center for Security Policy: PfP Training Center (GCSP)	86
4. Geneva: International Center for Humanitarian Demining	88
5. Operation SWISSCOY	88
C. ACTIVITIES “IN THE SPIRIT OF PFP”	90
D. CENCOOP: A MULTINATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO PFP OUTSIDE FROM PFP?	92
E. THE FUTURE	95
1. PfP in General	95
2. Army XXI (Interoperability)	96
3. Switzerland as Member of NATO	97
VI. SWITZERLAND ON THE WAY TO THE EU OR FOREVER A SECRET MEMBER?	101
A. FROM EFTA TO THE SWISS VOTE TO JOIN THE EEA (6 DECEMBER 1992)	101
1. From EFTA to the EEA: A Policy of Step by Step	101
2. Swiss “No” to the EEA: One Step Back?	104
3. The Steps After the Ballot about the EEA Contract	110
B. SWISS-EU: INTEGRATION REPORT 1999	112
C. THE BILATERAL TREATIES	117

D. THE SWISS GOALS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLICY FROM THE 20 TH CENTURY TO THE 21 ST CENTURY.....	120
VII. CONCLUSION	125
APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS	133
BIBLIOGRAPHY	137
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	145

I. INTRODUCTION

“Why Switzerland? Switzerland is a special and fascinating place. Its unique institutions, its direct democracy, multi-member executives, absence of strikes, communal autonomy, its universal military service, its wealth, and four national languages make it interesting in itself. But it has wider significance.”¹

Switzerland was a member of the League of Nations, but has never joined the United Nations (UN). Switzerland nonetheless works closely with the United Nations, and the Swiss are active in the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE). The Swiss never tried to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but there is a growing engagement in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Switzerland is an island surrounded by the European Union (EU), and still resists membership. The Swiss Government wants to join the EU, but the Swiss public still says “no.” The *Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy*, finished in 1999, promotes the slogan “Security through Cooperation.” In the overview the Swiss Government included the following subtitles: “New situation – Our previous strategy – The new strategy – Part of the framework: neutrality – Our new security policy...and its consequences.”² On the one hand, the Swiss Government tries to have an open policy regarding European and world affairs. On the

¹ Jonathan Steinberg, *Why Switzerland*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), “Introduction.”

²The Federal Departement of Defense, Civil Protections, and Sports (DDPS), *An Overview of the Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy* (Bern: Government Printing Office, 1999).

other hand, however, a great part of the Swiss population says “no” to this opening, because it wants to remain neutral.

This thesis will examine the proposition that the new policy of cooperation is compatible with Swiss neutrality, and could therefore make it possible for Switzerland to join the UN as well as the EU. To understand Swiss policy, it is necessary to examine Swiss history, the country’s system and its relationship to the UN, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU.

The first chapter examines the “special feeling of Swiss freedom” and its consequences. Switzerland started as a country in 1291 with a letter of freedom, and it has had several constitutions over the centuries. Under the influence of the Thirty Years’ War the Swiss wrote the Diet of Wil in 1647 to create a joint federal army to maintain neutrality. In 1648, as a part of the Peace of Westphalia, the Swiss obtained recognition of their independence. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna recognized Switzerland’s permanent neutrality. While Switzerland always fought for its sovereignty, it has always pursued a policy of “offering good offices.” For example, the Swiss established the International Committee of the Red Cross. The *White Paper on Switzerland’s Foreign Policy*, like the new *Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy*, demonstrates the Swiss interest in cooperation. On the other hand, the Swiss in their ballots try to constrain the government, because they want to preserve their neutrality. It is important to know this history and tradition in order to understand the thinking of the Swiss. This chapter will nonetheless show that the policy of neutrality has been revised several times in the past and that the policy of cooperation is compatible with Swiss neutrality.

Although Switzerland provided the headquarters for and was an active member of the League of Nations, it decided not to join the UN, because its neutrality was not recognized by the UN. It has, however, joined most of the UN's specialized agencies. Geneva also hosts the European headquarters of the United Nations. Since 1953 the Swiss have been sending UN observers, medical units, and other supporting units all over the world. However, the Swiss voted in 1986 against UN membership and in 1994 against the creation of a UN battalion. In the early 1980s the Swiss Government believed that UN membership would not be compatible with Swiss neutrality. Later, the Federal Council has changed its mind and would like Switzerland to join the UN after having joined the EU. There exists also a Swiss initiative to join the UN in the first decade of the 21st century. This chapter will show that Switzerland is almost a member of UN, given its extensive UN-related activities, and that UN membership would be compatible with Swiss neutrality.

Since 1972 Switzerland has been a member of the OSCE, known until 1994 as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Switzerland is committed to supporting international efforts at cooperation, and is actively engaged in promoting peace. The Confederation pursues its objectives through various institutions and organizations, the most prominent of which include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The foundation of the OSCE shows some parallels to the Swiss policy today. In the beginning, the Swiss expressed some skepticism about the CSCE-process, but Federal Councilor Pierre Graber convinced the Swiss to support it.

Therefore, beginning in 1970 Switzerland was very active in the foundation of the CSCE, and the CSCE became an important part of Swiss foreign policy.

This chapter will examine, in the first part, Switzerland's skepticism in joining the OSCE and its movement towards full engagement today. A second part of this chapter will examine the organization of the OSCE and the Swiss involvement in creating the institutions of the OSCE. For example, Switzerland has traditionally entered into strong commitments in support of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was opened on 29 May 1995. In 1996 Switzerland acted as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE. With the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, new tasks unexpectedly emerged for the OSCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina, making great demands on the Chairman-in-Office. In the introduction of the book *From a Passive Role to the Leading Actor – Switzerland and its OSCE-Presidium*, Federal Councilor Flavio Cotti, the Chairman-in-Office in 1996, wrote that the Swiss Federal Council had to be aware that after the ballot against the creation of the UN battalion, the Swiss would not support the presidium and would have considered this action to be the first step to UN membership.³ The chapter will show that the contrary is what happened, and will explain why the Swiss supported the engagement of the Government.

Another important organization is NATO's Partnership for Peace. The Swiss Government decided on 30 October 1996 to accept NATO's invitation to participate in

³ Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller, Die Schweiz und ihre OSZE-Präsidentenschaft* (Bern-Stuttgart-Wien, 1997), p. VI.

the PfP program. This decision reflects Switzerland's increasing international involvement in the area of security policy. This chapter shows how Switzerland wants to take an active part in security issues. This chapter also explains why Switzerland does not want to join NATO, although the Swiss actively support NATO-led operations such as SFOR and KFOR.

Although Switzerland is surrounded by EU states, the Swiss resist joining the EU. On the one hand, the Swiss Government has proclaimed several times that its goal is to join the EU. On the other hand, great parts of the Swiss population are against membership in the EU. This chapter will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of an EU membership. It will also examine factors other than neutrality that bear upon a decision to join or not to join the EU.

The thesis will demonstrate that Switzerland has taken significant positions affecting world security policy. It is possible that Switzerland's neutrality, which should not be seen as an end in itself but rather as a means to an end which includes the protection of Swiss interests, still has a future. The thesis will also elucidate the gap between the Swiss Government and the Swiss population. Every chapter examines the relationship between the Swiss Government and the Swiss. The Swiss Government has still not realized that it has to convince the Swiss public to support its goals. This will be the great challenge for the future.

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II. THE SWISS SYSTEM

A. DEMOCRACY: FROM THE FIRST LETTER OF FREEDOM IN 1291 TO THE 2000 CONSTITUTION

According to Teimer's dictionary of politics in Europe, after the examples in ancient Athens, the first real democracies can be found already in the tenth century.⁴ According to this source, Switzerland started its democratic tradition in the thirteenth century.

Against the pressure of Habsburg power, the people of three cantons – Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden – decided to manage the territory themselves. In 1291, to demonstrate this decision the leading families of these cantons concluded a pact and wrote a “letter of freedom” with six points. They promised to help each other in wartime against foreign aggressors. They decided that if there were problems within the cantons, they would install a court of arbitration. They also decided that they would regularly come together to advise each other and to secure the freedom of the “country.” They called these meetings “Tagsatzung.” In subsequent writings about decisions from the cantons or decisions made by the Swiss, the term “Tagsatzung” came to mean a forum to take decisions. Furthermore, the families defined this pact as an eternal one. Although the alliance of 1291 as a conservative oath alliance essentially corresponds to the many alliances concluded at the time to protect peace, this arrangement nevertheless demonstrated the common will to secure self-administration. Over the centuries more

cantons joined this written pact.⁵ Today Switzerland consists of twenty-three cantons. In several wars they had to fight against foreigners to defend their freedom, but there were also wars within this growing country.

In 1315 the cantons Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden rewrote the first “letter of freedom.” Obwalden joined the pact, which was written for the first time in German. The historians Bandle and Schaffner call the rewritten pact a constitution.⁶

The 16th century was marked by the Reformation. Within the cantons there were several confessional pacts and confessional wars. These wars, these religious conflicts, brought the cantons nearer to each other. In the end they felt more unity than before. The Thirty Years’ War helped to strengthen this unity. Because the states in the Thirty Year’s War neglected the Swiss frontiers, in 1647 the Swiss declared in the pact of Wil the armed neutrality of their country. In this pact they decided to engage 36,000 people from all cantons to secure the frontier. As a result of this pact, in 1648 the European governments accepted the cantons as an independent state.⁷ As a result of the Reformation, the confessional wars, and Switzerland’s acceptance as an independent state, the parity of the religions became a strong principle. Even the French and the German parts of Switzerland came closer together, because the Reformation leaders in

⁴ Walter Teimer, *Lexikon der Politik, Politische Begriffe, Namen, Systeme, Gedanken und Probleme aller Länder*, 7th ed. (Bern und München, 1967), p. 127.

⁵ Max Bandle, *Auszug aus der Schweizergeschichte*, 6th ed. (Zürich, 1985), p. 33.

⁶ Bandle, Max, *Auszug aus der Schweizergeschichte*, p. 65 and Schaffner, Fritz, *Abriss der Schweizer Geschichte*, 10th ed. (Frauenfeld und Stuttgart, 1976), p. 66.

⁷ Schaffner, Fritz, *Abriss der Schweizer Geschichte*, p. 90.

Zurich and in Geneva had the same ideas. The freedom of religion and the acceptance of this freedom of religion have their roots in these centuries.

In 1797 French troops occupied parts of Switzerland. A result of this occupation was that the French forced the Swiss to write a new constitution. On the one hand, the Swiss had the freedom to vote, and the freedoms of religion, media, speech, and education. On the other hand, the cantons had no political rights as they had before. They had to accept French centralism. The Swiss lost the first fight against this centralism in 1798. As a result of this fight political parties came into being. In 1803 Napoleon made some concessions and gave the cantons some rights. In 1815 the neutrality of Switzerland and the permanence of its frontiers were accepted at the Congress of Vienna. One result of this congress was a new constitution providing for strong federalism.

After the establishment of constitutions also in the cantons and a new confessional war in 1848 the Swiss decided to write a new constitution. This constitution gave Switzerland the shape it has today. Again in 1874 the Swiss accepted a renewed constitution, and in 1999 they did the same. The main parts of these three constitutions are identical.

Today Switzerland is a nation shaped by the resolve of its citizens. It is not an ethnic, linguistic, or religious entity. For example, in Switzerland there are four official languages: German, French, Italian and Romansch. Since 1848, it has been a federal state – one of twenty-three in the world and the second oldest after the United States of America. Switzerland has a federal structure with three different political levels: the

Federation, the cantons and the local authorities. In this structure the Swiss people with their political rights retain an important role. The cantons, often called the “States,” have their own constitution, parliament, government, and courts. All the cantons are divided into municipalities or communes. Some of them also have their own parliaments. Within this political structure, the Swiss people are the foundation. The Federal Constitution defines the Swiss people as having sovereignty over the country. They have rights at every political level.

The Swiss have a parliament with two chambers: the National Council and the Council of States, both elected by the Swiss people. The National Council represents the whole population and the Council of States each canton. Together, the National Council and the Council of States constitute the legislative authority. The National Council and the Council of States form together the United Federal Assembly, which is responsible for the election of the Government. The Swiss Government consists of the seven members of the Federal Council, elected for four years. An unwritten law exists that says which political party has a seat in the Government. The President of the Confederation is elected by the parliament for one year and is regarded as the “*primus inter pares*,” or first among equals. He or she chairs the meetings of the Federal Council and undertakes special representational duties. The duties of a President are in addition to the duties of his department.

Every Swiss citizen above the age of eighteen enjoys “active and passive” voting rights in elections to the National Council and the Council of States. In other words, they may cast their votes and also themselves stand for election. They have also the right to

start an initiative to change parts of the constitution. For such an initiative to be organized they have to collect the signatures of 100,000 voters within 18 months. In addition the Swiss have the right to start a referendum against a law. For that they have to collect 50,000 signatures within 100 days of publication of a decree. The referendum is similar to a veto and has the effect of delaying and safeguarding the political process by blocking amendments adopted by Parliament or the Government. Therefore the referendum is often described as a "brake" applied by the people.

Since 1848 there have been four big political parties: the Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP), the Free Economic Democratic Party (FDP), the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the Socialist Party (SP). They take seats in the Government following an unwritten law: two seats CVP, two seats FDP, two seats SP, one seat SVP. Switzerland has a total of about ten active political parties. All these parties are important, because every party feels responsible for a part of the Swiss, and they have a great influence on foreign policy.

B. SWISS NEUTRALITY

A lot of Swiss people say, "We are a neutral country. We have to stay home and do our work. Father Klaus of Flüeli, the patron of Switzerland, told us not to get in trouble with foreign affairs." Other Swiss citizens say, "Switzerland should retain neutrality and play a stronger role in international conferences." Which way is the right way? At the beginning, neutrality was a kind of emergency stop-gap. However, over the course of history, it acquired rules and is therefore firmly rooted in the Swiss

consciousness. To understand Swiss neutrality, it is important to define it, to know its history, and as a result to see that in future situations it will need new responses.

“Neutral” comes from the Latin “ne uter” – neither. A power is neutral when it does not take sides in a war. Neutrality law, the international situation, history, and tradition are decisive factors governing the policy of neutrality. On one the hand, the neutrality law provides the legal framework for the involvement of a state. On the other hand, the international situation influences the neutrality policy of a country.

The first step in Swiss neutrality history is the battle of Marignano in 1515. In this battle and the following peace Switzerland developed a reticence in foreign policies that has lasted for centuries. During the French occupation in 1789 Switzerland lost its neutrality, but in 1815 the European powers recognized Switzerland’s permanent neutrality. In 1907 Switzerland signed the Hague Conventions on Rights and Duties of Neutral States. As late as 1919, it was possible that armed escorts of the Swiss army protected goods transports to Eastern Europe. In 1920 Switzerland joined the League of Nations and Geneva became the headquarters. Switzerland’s neutrality was recognized, and the Swiss were also prepared to join in applying economic sanctions. At the beginning of the Second World War, the Swiss government confirmed its neutrality, and this was recognized by all other nations. Switzerland mobilized its army to assert its independence and neutrality. After the Second World War the motive became “neutrality and solidarity.” As a first step, in 1953 the Swiss sent observers to Korea.

Today most conflicts are no longer between states but within states. Neutrality law does not apply in these cases. For the government it has always been clear that new

situations need new responses. For example, in the overview of the *Report 2000 on Swiss Security* the Federal Department of Defense included the following sentences:

The new strategy of Swiss security policy is geared towards cooperation....Internationally, cooperation with friendly states and international security organizations will be expanded, as well as the Swiss commitment to enhancing peace. Such a commitment reflects our own interests: it reduces the risk that Switzerland itself is affected by the consequences of instability and war....The law of neutrality leaves considerable freedom for maneuver to the neutral state. In the current political-military environment neutrality must be interpreted in an active way which expresses a spirit of solidarity. Neutrality does not prevent Switzerland from an active commitment to enhancing peace or from cooperation in military training. However, the law of neutrality prohibits military support of any warring parties.⁸

Sometimes the Swiss political system blocks this "considerable freedom." For example, the chief of the defense department is trying to change the military law. One article in the military law prohibits sending armed troops abroad, although this is not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. In November 1999 the Federal Council sent a proposal with the new law to the National Council and to the Council of States to approve the new law. In the meantime the SP and the SVP as well as the CINS (Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland)⁹ announced that they intended to start a

⁸ The Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protections, and Sports, *An Overview of the Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy*, pp. 4-5.

⁹ The CINS was founded in 1986. Its president, Christoph Blocher, is also the president of the SVP in the canton Zurich. The association has more than 35,000 members, most of them in the German speaking part of Switzerland. After the UN referendum in 1986 former National Councilor Otto Fischer and National Councilor Christoph Blocher predicted that there would be a constant need to monitor and intervene in Swiss foreign policy in the future. The CINS defined in its program that it "will fight with all its strength: against EU membership, against a repeat EEA referendum, against NATO membership, against armed Swiss soldiers serving abroad, against moves to undermine permanent, armed neutrality, against any restriction in direct democracy, against an illusory solidarity forced upon us by blackmailers

referendum against the law. As a consequence the Swiss people will have to say “yes” or “no” to this law.¹⁰

C. THE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY

1. Swiss Foreign Policy After World War II Until the Cold War

Max Petitpierre was from 1945 to 1961 responsible for Swiss foreign policy as head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. On the one hand he tried to break the Swiss isolationism of World War II, on the other hand Switzerland was very reserved in stressing the primary goals of Swiss independence and Swiss neutrality. As a consequence of this policy the Swiss refused to join political and military organizations because of its neutrality. However, they tried to collaborate in organizations of an economic, humanitarian, and technological nature in order to demonstrate solidarity. Hence, in 1948 Switzerland got the status of an observer in the UN, worked actively in their sub-organization, and it joined the International Court at Den Hague. The same year Switzerland joined the Organization for European Economical Collaboration (OEEC), but it refused to join the Treaty of Rome.

In 1963, under Councilor Traugott Wahlen, head of the Federal Foreign Department from 1961 to 1965, Switzerland joined the Council of Europe. In 1949 they

in direct democracy, against an illusory solidarity forced upon us by blackmailers inside and outside Switzerland.” [<http://www.cins.ch/portrait.htm>] 10 October 1999.

¹⁰ For more information on Swiss neutrality see: Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sports, *Swiss Neutrality*, 2nd ed. (Bern: Government Printing Office, 1999) and Edgar Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität, Drei Jahrhunderte eidgenössischer Aussenpolitik*, Band I-XI (Basel, 1946). For details on the Swiss military law see sub-chapter “From the Report 1990 on Swiss Security Policy to the Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy.”

did not want to join this organization, because they thought that the Council of Europe would make a common European foreign policy. In 1959, the Swiss became members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In 1962, together with Sweden and Austria the Swiss Government sent the European Community (EC) an association request, and in 1966 the Swiss joined the organization of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In 1966, Willy Spühler became head of the Federal Foreign Department. As a political guideline he chose to "relegate of the Swiss special way of thinking and get over the hedgehog mentality."¹¹ In 1969 and in 1971, the Federal Council wrote reports on the Swiss relationship to the United Nations. After 1948, membership of the United Nations became for the first time a subject of political discussion, although the Federal Council still was not convinced about the desirability of a Swiss membership.

Under Councilor Pierre Graber Swiss foreign policy became more and more active. The active collaboration in the OSCE was the main part. The second main event was the Free Trade Agreement between Switzerland and the EC. In 1972, the Swiss people said "yes" to this agreement, but only because Swiss neutrality, Swiss federalism, and Swiss political rights were not affected by the treaty. The same year Switzerland also signed the European Human Rights Convention, and in 1975 the Federal Council said "yes" to the European Social Charter. In 1977, in a third report about the Swiss

¹¹ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa: Die KSZE-Politik der Schweiz bis zur Unterzeichnung der Helsinki-Schlussakte zwischen Skepsis und aktivem Engagement (1996)*, Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, No. 40 (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, 1996), p. 59.

relationship to the United Nations, the Federal Council said, for the first time, “yes” to Swiss membership, but in 1986 the Swiss people said “no” to membership.

In summary, after World War II there still was a sense of Swiss isolationism. After 1960 Swiss foreign policy took its first steps towards Europe and generally the world. With the membership of the OSCE the Swiss started a new foreign policy.¹²

2. The Foreign Policy Principles in the Beginning of the 21st Century: The White Papers on Swiss Integration Policy

Swiss foreign policy operates against a background, which has not only changed fundamentally and radically over the last ten years, but it is also characterized by a very high level of movement.

The White Paper on Switzerland’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s, approved by the Federal Council in 1993, provides the guidelines for Swiss foreign policy. Swiss neutrality remains a deeply-rooted concept with a certain mysticism within the Swiss population. However, it has lost much of its importance as an instrument of foreign policy. The annex of the *White Paper on Switzerland’s Foreign Policy in the 90s* deals with Swiss neutrality.

Five foreign policy objectives are examined in depth in the *White Paper on Switzerland’s Foreign Policy in the 90s*: preservation and promotion of security and peace; commitment in favor of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; increased

¹² Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, p. 49-77.

general prosperity; promotion of social cohesion and the preservation of the environment.¹³ After the examination of these issues the Federal Council concluded:

Our absence from major international organizations is no longer an advantage; the serious disadvantages that it entails compel us to eliminate the handicaps under which we labor by gaining a presence in an increasing our commitment to European and worldwide institutions....Cooperation and collective decision-making are the key to defending the country's interests. On the international level, these two will strengthen Switzerland's identity and, through them, we will take our destiny in our own hands and consolidate our position within the international community.¹⁴

Since 1989 there have been a number of parliamentary questions on neutrality and the Federal Council has been asked to prepare a detailed white paper on the subject, which became an annex to the mentioned report on Swiss foreign policy. On the one hand, the introduction by the Federal Council explained clearly that neutrality remained an appropriate instrument for conducting Switzerland's foreign and security policy and that it still served to safeguard the national interests. On the other hand, it explained that the Swiss neutrality had to be reviewed from time to time to verify that it was still an appropriate foreign and security policy instrument and to adapt it if necessary to new requirements.¹⁵

¹³ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s* (Bern: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 7.

¹⁴ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*, p. 39.

¹⁵ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Neutrality, Annex to the Report on Swiss Foreign Policy for the Nineties of 29 November 1993* (Bern: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 4 and 7.

In the same context, one has to be read the *White Papers on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*¹⁶ and the *Integration Report 1999*, which dealt with relations between Switzerland and the EU.

3. From the Report 1990 on Swiss Security Policy to the Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy

a) Report 1990 on Swiss Security Policy

In the report, the Federal Council already called the contribution to international stability, primarily in Europe, a security policy goal and explained the stabilization and strengthening of the peace process as an emphasis of the security policy strategy of Switzerland. In the security mission of the armed forces "peace promotion" became as important as "war prevention and defense" and "general safeguarding of existence."¹⁷ In the *Armed Forces 95* project the appropriate conclusions were drawn. Unarmed and even armed troop contingents were considered in order for peace-keeping actions of the UN or other international organizations.¹⁸

b) Report of the Study Commission on Strategic Issues (Brunner Commission, 1998)

In June 1996, the head of the Department of Defense, Federal Councilor Adolf Ogi, appointed the former ambassador Edouard Brunner as head of *The Study*

¹⁶ The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*: Three reports: 16 June 1969, 17 November 1971, 29 June 1977 and 1 July 1998.

¹⁷ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel, Bericht 90 des Bundesrates und die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz* (Bern: Bundespresse, 1990), p. 30-43.

¹⁸ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Armeeleitbild 95* (Bern: Bundespresse, 1992), pp. 49 and 75-76.

Commission on Strategic Issues. The so-called *Brunner Commission*, consisting of forty members, presented its conclusion in a twenty-seven-page report on 26 February 1998.

This commission, again as others before, came to the conclusion:

We must co-operate with our neighbors as well as with the Atlantic and European organisations to enhance security....The commission welcomes that the Federal Council has set the accession to the EU as a strategic objective and that it has, through Partnership for Peace, found a way to co-operate with NATO....We note that the *raison d'être* of neutrality is increasingly being questioned at home and abroad. Nevertheless it retains its place in the Swiss collective mind. We recommend that the federal authorities continue applying neutrality pragmatically and with flexibility...¹⁹

Two months after the presentation of the *Brunner Report*, Christoph Blocher, who was a member of the commission but did not sign the report, published his own report on future Swiss security policy. He did not sign the *Brunner Report* because, according to him, it "disassociated itself from the principle of permanent neutrality" and intensioned a "step-by-step incorporation into the UN, the EU, the WEU [West European Union] and NATO."²⁰ Christoph Blocher mentioned the UN, but in the report the UN is never mentioned as a security institution. Although there was no great public response, it is remarkable that two months after the publication of the *Brunner Commission Report*,

¹⁹ Brunner Commission, *Report of the Study Commission on Strategic Issues* (Bern 1998), "Executive Summary." [<http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/e/armee/pub/brunn/index.htm>] 20 March 2000. For discussion see: Kurt Spillmann and others, eds., *Der Bericht Brunner: Impulse und Reaktionen*, Bulletin 1999 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich, 1999). Josef Inauen, ed., *Swiss Army 2000, Armed forces and civil protection in Switzerland* (Frauenfeld/Stuttgart/Vienna: Huber Verlag, 1999).

²⁰ Christoph Blocher, *Strategic Study Report on the Redevelopment of Swiss Security Policy* (1998). [<http://www.cins.ch/arcxhiv.htm>] 20 March 2000.

Christoph Blocher was able to publish a “counterreport” in four languages²¹ on the internet as well as brochure.

c) Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy

The *Report of the Study Commission on Strategic Issues* gave the political guidelines for the *Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland*, under the heading “Security through Cooperation,” in June 1999.

In the tradition of the foreign policy of the 1990s the Federal Council came to the conclusion that it will be necessary to establish “an enhanced collaboration with international security organizations and friendly states in order to contribute, through mutually reinforcing co-operation, to stability and peace in our extended geographic sphere.” According to the Federal Council it served “not only to strengthen the solidarity that was expected from us; it was also a judicious investment in our own security.” The Swiss neutrality still was called a “traditional neutrality”, but one “making full use of the freedom of action provided by the law of neutrality.”²²

d) The Swiss Military System

The Swiss Armed Forces are divided into the Army Staff and units, three Field Army Corps, one Mountain Army Corps, and the Air Force. The Swiss Armed Forces are based on the militia principle, which means that only a small part of them are military professionals. Most of the soldiers, sub-officers, and officers come every second

²¹ Published in German, French, Italian and English.

year together to train themselves. That also means that for military engagement abroad to support the OSCE or the UN, the Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports (DDPS) has to find soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers, must train them in special missions, and make a special contract with them. To improve this system the DDPS started in 1999 with the planning for the *Army XXI*, which is to be introduced step-by-step after 2003.²³

**e) *The Swiss Military Law: An Obstacle for
Future Military Engagements Abroad?***

In November 1999, the Federal Council sent to the Parliament the draft of a partial revision of the military law. The first part of the revision would give the right to the Federal Council to conclude international agreements in order to give the armed forces the possibility to train abroad, to give special foreign troops the possibility to train in Switzerland, and for Swiss and foreign troops to train together in military exercises. The second part of the revision would enable the Federal Council, in certain cases, to order the "appropriate arming" of Swiss troop contingents serving abroad. Until now, the military law did not allow the armament of a full military unit for self-defense.²⁴

²² The Federal Council, *Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland* (Bern: Government Printing Office, 1999), "Summary."

²³ The Commission for Strategic Issues and the Security Policy Report gave the political background for the planning staff.

²⁴ For details see: Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Botschaft betreffend die Aenderung des Militärgesetzes* (Bern: Bundespresse, October 1999).

In March 2000 the National Council said “yes” to the revision of the military law.²⁵ The SP, as well as the CINS, decided to start a referendum if the Council of States also said “yes” to the revision.²⁶ As a consequence, the Swiss people will have to decide if they want to accept the revised military law. This ballot will show if the Federal Council is able to convince the Swiss public, especially the socialist and the conservative parts.

²⁵ “Etappensieg für den Verteidigungsminister, Nationalrat für bewaffnete Auslandseinsätze der Armee,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 15 March 2000.

²⁶ “Referendum bereits beschlossen,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 14 March 2000. [<http://www.newswindow.ch/artikel/000314/000314c14.html>] 14 March 2000. “WK im Ausland: Die Auns reklamiert,” in: *Tages Anzeiger*, 2 November 1999. Gustav Däniker, “Sicherheitspolitik 2000, Die Diskussion geht weiter,” in: *ASMZ*, 1/2000. “Ausbildungszusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland?,” in: *ASMZ*, 1/2000.

III. SWITZERLAND: NON-MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT ACHIEVING AND PAYING MORE THAN OTHERS

A. SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS: FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO THE 21ST CENTURY

1. From 1920 to the Swiss Ballot in 1986

After an intensive debate by the parliament and the Swiss population, the Swiss people said "yes" to an entry in the League of Nations in the ballot of 16 May 1920. Upon entry Switzerland did not succeed in obtaining a special note on Swiss neutrality. However, on 13 February 1920 Switzerland was released from participation in military sanctions. Later, in 1938, Switzerland was also released from participation in economic sanctions.

On the occasion of the establishment of the UN in San Francisco, it was clearly expressed by France and other states that the neutrality status of a country was not compatible with the system of collective security. Without express guarantee of Swiss neutrality the Swiss Government did not see the possibility of UN entry, as the Federal Council wrote to the UN Secretary General in 1946. However, in the same year in an informal agreement with the Secretary General, Switzerland obtained observer status at the UN in New York and, in 1965, in Geneva. After the ratification of the statute of the International Court of Justice, Switzerland joined many newly created special organizations and committees.²⁷

²⁷ For details see: Le Roy Bennett, *International Organizations, Principles and Issues*, 6th ed. (London: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 81, and Francois Nordmann and Dominique Petter, "Le rôle de l'ONU dans la

In 1969, the Federal Council concluded in its first UN report that UN entry was possible and useful. This was confirmed in the subsequent reports and led, in 1986, to the ballot on Swiss entry into the UN, which was rejected by Swiss people.²⁸

2. From the Ballot in 1986 to Possible Swiss UN Membership in the First Decade of the 21st Century: Discrepancy between Observer Status and Achievements

In 1998, the Federal Council wrote a report on the relationship of Switzerland and the UN, describing in detail the achievements of Switzerland between 1986 and 1997.²⁹ With annexes this report has more than 100 pages. The Parliament accepted this report, but there was no great discussion by the parliament or the public. Due to the lack of interest of the public in UN issues, this report received little attention, although it is readable and informative. As a basis of the political goals, the Federal Council used the *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*.

politique étrangère de la Suisse, des relations exemplaires mais incomplètes,” in: *La Vie Économique*, 7/93 (Bern: Publication du Département fédéral de l' économie publique, 1993), p. 22. Francois Nordmann counted more than thirty-nine UN organizations, in which Switzerland was member or participated in working groups.

²⁸ For details see: Daniel Thürer, “Die Schweiz und die Vereinten Nationen,” in: Alois Riklin, Hans Haug and Raymond Probst, eds., *Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik* (Bern-Stuttgart-Wien: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1992), pp. 327-331. The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations* (Bern: Government Printing Office – internet, 1997), pp. 4-6. [<http://www.eda.ch/site/e/publikationen/berichte/berichtuno.html>] 10 March 2000.

²⁹ The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations* (Bern, 1998), [<http://www.eda.admin.ch/site/e/publikationen/berichte/berichtuno.html>] 10 March 2000.

In the *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s* the Federal Council defined UN membership as a strategic goal.³⁰ The Federal Council came to the conclusion that the goals with regard to foreign policy of Switzerland were in accordance with the UN Charter. Therefore, the Swiss Government promoted the peace-keeping operations of the UN,³¹ joined Partnership for Peace, became a full member of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in June 1996, and established several education centers in Geneva, because all these activities lay in the Swiss tradition.³²

However, the Federal Council detected more and more a discrepancy between the observer status of Switzerland and its achievements. This shows up in the financial contributions. As an observer Switzerland pays 30 percent of its contribution as it would have to pay as a member of the UN. In 1997, those were approximately \$ 3.8 million, which corresponds to 5.5 million Swiss francs. In addition to this 30 percent Switzerland pays more dues to the sub-organizations and a great amount on a voluntarily basis. In 1997, Switzerland paid a total sum to the UN of 470 million Swiss francs. Thus, Switzerland is already among the most important financial contributors to the UN. The additional costs of full membership would amount to approximately 35.7 millions Swiss francs, or only 7 percent more than before. Of that, approximately 13.2 million Swiss francs would go to the UN budget and 22.5 million Swiss francs to peace-keeping

³⁰ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*, pp. 36-37.

³¹ Francois Nordmann counted in 1993 twenty-three peace-keeping operations, in which Switzerland was participated. Francois Nordmann and Dominique Petter, "Le rôle de l'ONU dans la politique étrangère de la Suisse, des relations exemplaires mais incomplètes," p. 23.

operations. In accordance with its observer status, Switzerland does not have to pay contributions to peace-keeping operations. However, it takes part voluntarily. In 1997, approximately 13.4 million Swiss francs were spent on peace-keeping operations.³³ As a full member Switzerland would rank 13th in total amount of assessed dues.³⁴ Switzerland is also represented among those countries receiving the greatest share of UN contracts. For example in 1996, it ranked 6th, with contracts worth around \$ 112 millions.³⁵

Swiss neutrality is no obstacle to membership in the UN. The Federal Council concluded in its report about Switzerland and the UN the following:

Membership of the UN is compatible with our neutrality. UN membership would not require us to give up our neutrality, nor do our obligations as a neutral power constitute an obstacle to membership....A country with the status of permanent neutrality has its place within the UN. Neutrality is recognised without opposition by the UN and its members.³⁶

³² The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, chapter 3, pp. 15-17.

³³ The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, chapter 3, pp. 18, 22; chapter 4, pp. 34-35; conclusion, pp. 40-41; annex: "Switzerland's contributions to the UN system 1995-1997", p. 47; appendix 7: "Switzerland's involvement in UN peacekeeping missions," p. 65.

³⁴ Eidgenössisches Departement für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, *Schweiz global, UNO spezial*, Das Magazin des EDA, Ausgabe 1/99 (Bern: EDA 1999), p. 10.

³⁵ The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, chapter 45, p 36.

³⁶ The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, chapter 5, p 39.

The compatibility of Swiss neutrality and UN membership is one of the reasons that Switzerland voluntarily took part in UN economic sanctions.³⁷ Already in 1993 the Federal Council wrote in the *Annex to the Report on Swiss Foreign Policy for the Nineties, the White Paper on Neutrality* about this compatibility.³⁸

B. GENEVA, A SWISS TOWN, AS THE "CENTER OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATIONS"

1. Geneva, an International City

The Swiss city of Geneva is the most important European seat of the United Nations. Approximately 30,000 people living in Geneva work for international organizations and the UN system. More than thirty international organizations are established in Geneva. Annually 90,000 visitors travel to Geneva for conferences. Since the establishment of the Red Cross in 1863, and the League of Nations in 1919, Geneva has become an international city, and has constantly worked to maintain this status in the competition to other cities such as Bonn, Montreal and The Hague.³⁹

³⁷ The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, annex 5: "The principal international UN sanctions," p.57; chapter 5: "Swiss neutrality in the context of the UN," p 37.

³⁸ The Federal Council, *Annex to the Report on Swiss Foreign Policy for the Nineties, the White Paper on Neutrality*, chapter 412, p. 19.

³⁹ For details see: Jean-Pierre Vettovaglia, "La Suisse en tant que pays d'accueil d'organisations et de conférences internationales," in: *Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik*, pp. 777-789. The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, chapter 42, p. 31-32. René Rhinow, *Die schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im internationalen Umfeld* (Basel und Frankfurt, 1995), pp. 66-67. *Geneva International*, [<http://www.geneva-international.org/welcome.f.html>] 19 March 2000.

2. A New Swiss Foundation: The International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

In November 1997, the Swiss Government, determined to make further contributions in countering the worldwide landmine problem, decided to set up a foundation in Geneva dedicated to the promotion of humanitarian de-mining. The Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was formally created by the Swiss Government and the Canton of Geneva on 28 April 1998 as a foundation under Swiss legislation but with an international responsibility. The foundation is represented by Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States. The DDPS mainly finances this foundation. A number of countries provide the center with staff and finance specific studies.

The GICHD systematically collects, analyzes and distributes lessons learned for de-mining issues in order to lower the number of the mine victims in the world. Today in this area the GICHD is the most important partner of the United Nations and is a central coordinating authority on the international level. The center is the only institution devoted to humanitarian de-mining, in which the concerned states and donors, the member states of the Ottawa Convention and the United States as the most important non-member country, Field Specialists, and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are represented and cooperate closely with each other. On the occasion of the first subsequent conference of the Ottawa Convention (comprehensive prohibition of the anti-personnel mines) in Maputo in 1999, the position of the GICHD became additionally

strengthened, as the support of the secretariats of all working groups of the contract were awarded to the GICHD.⁴⁰

**C. THE SWISS ENGAGEMENT IN THREE UN ORGANIZATIONS
REGARDING JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL**

Already in 1948, Switzerland became a member of the International Court of Justice and supported this institution financially and with personnel.⁴¹ In July 1998, 160 nations decided to establish a permanent International Criminal Court to try individuals for the most serious offences of global concern. Switzerland was one of the first countries to sign the statute of the International Criminal Court, on 18 July 1998.⁴²

On 11 August 1999, the Security Council of the UN followed the recommendation of Secretary General Kofi Annan and appointed the Swiss Federal Attorney Carla del Ponte as the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Federal Council noticed with satisfaction the knowledge that with Mrs. Del Ponte, a Swiss, would take over one of the most important tasks in the context of the UN. In addition, the choice of the federal attorney

⁴⁰ For more details see: *Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining*, [<http://www.gichd.ch>] In addition, the General Secretariat of the Swiss Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports created several fact sheets (unpublished).

⁴¹ Daniel Thürer, "Die Schweiz und die Vereinten Nationen," in: *Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik*, pp. 319 and 330.

⁴² *Nationalrat: Herbstsession 1998, Frage Rechsteiner Paul, Internationaler Strafgerichtshof*, [www.parlament.ch/internet98/Poly/Suchen_amtl_Bulletin/cn98/autonome/407.htm] 11 August 1999.

also was an acknowledgment of the long Swiss commitment to the search for a solution to the conflicts in the Balkans. The Government recalled that it had endorsed the establishment of the Hague Tribunal, and always supported its activity. Therefore, the naming of a Swiss to the post of Chief Prosecutor was a high point of Swiss efforts to create a reliable penal jurisdiction for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Furthermore, by this appointment, Switzerland could prove its support for the activities of the United Nations.⁴³

**D. THE SWISS BLUE BERETS AND OTHER SWISS CITIZENS ABROAD
IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

**1. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea
(NNSC): Switzerland Engaged as a Neutral Country
from 1953 to the 21st Century**

On 3 December 1951, on the occasion of the Korean negotiations for an armistice, North Korea suggested the use of neutral states for monitoring. On the same day, the US State Department informed the Swiss Ambassador in Washington that Switzerland should be one of those countries. On 7 May 1952, the warring countries agreed to engage officials of Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. On 7 July 1953, the Federal Council decided to make available ninety-six people for the monitoring commission and fifty people for the repatriation commission. Although the NNSC members were acting under a UN mandate, they were considered neither UN blue

International Criminal Court, *Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart*,
[<http://www.igc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify.html>] 20 October 1999.

⁴³ "Del Ponte einstimmig zur Chefanklägerin in Den Haag ernannt," in: *News Windows alert*,
[www.newswindows.ch/artikel/990811/990811c32.html] 11 August 1999. For details see: *International Law*, [<http://www.un.org/law>].

helmets, nor military observers. As military members of their country they had to act impartially in military-diplomatic negotiations in order to achieve conciliation. In March 2000, five Swiss Officers were still on duty in Panmunjom, supervising the armistice in the divided country.⁴⁴

2. United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG): The Swiss Medical Unit 1989-1990

In 1989, a medical unit was deployed to Namibia to guarantee the medical support for the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Between 1989 and 1990 an average of 150 Swiss men and women were on mission in Southwestern Africa.

In 1988, at the request of the UN, the Federal Council decided to take over medical support for the UNTAG in Namibia, and to contribute a contingent of military observers. The order of the UNTAG was to guarantee Namibia's quest for independence. The Swiss Medical Unit (SMU) was thereby engaged from 1989 to 1990. In accordance with the order of the UN, the SMU had to guarantee the medical support of the military and civilian detachments of the UNTAG, approximately 7,500 persons. Further, the SMU had to support local hospitals, to supply UN military observers in the south of Angola, and to enforce medical and hygienic controls in the context of the refugee repatriation. During the entire employment, over 400 Swiss were engaged, either with the Swiss Medical Unit or as election observers.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ For details see: Adrian Baumgartner, *Vortrag die Schweiz und UNO/NNSC* (Bern: Abteilung für friedenserhaltende Operationen, Generalstab, ohne Jahr).

⁴⁵ For details see: Adrian Baumgartner, *Vortrag Swiss Medical Unit – UNTAG-Namibia* (Bern: Abteilung für friedenserhaltende Operationen, Generalstab, ohne Jahr). Adrian Baumgartner, *UNTAG, Fact Sheet* (Bern: Abteilung für friedenserhaltende Operationen, Generalstab, ohne Jahr). Arthur Bill,

3. Missions des Nations Unie Pour le Referendum au Sahara Occidental (MINURSO): Swiss Medical Unit 1991-1994

After the good experience with UNTAG, the Swiss Federal Council decided to form another Medical Unit to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. Between 1991 and 1994 up to eighty Swiss volunteers ran three field hospitals for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO).⁴⁶

Total material costs amounted to over 12 million Swiss francs. An American military observer wrote about the Swiss in his final report to his superiors as follows:

"Switzerland, a country that is not even a UN member, has the best contingent here. Every one of them does his job without complaints or trying to gain personal recognition. I wish more countries could have contingents like the Swiss."⁴⁷

4. Operation "ALBA" in Support of the United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees (UNHCR)

On 6 April 1999, the Federal Council decided to commence Operation "ALBA." On the same day, the first Super Puma helicopter with an UNHR label landed in the Albanian main town Tirana. Until the end of July 1999 three Super Puma helicopters were employed by the UNHCR, flying over 700 missions. The three helicopters

Zur Erfahrungsbilanz des schweizerischen Einsatzes im Dienste der UNO in Namibia, Frühling 1989 bis Frühling 1990, Fact Sheet des Sonderbeauftragten des EDA für den UNTAG-Einsatz (Bern: EDA, 1990).

⁴⁶ For more information see: Adrian Baumgartner, *Vortrag Swiss Medical Unit – MINURSO* (Bern: Abteilung für friedenserhaltende Operationen, Generalstab, ohne Jahr). Beat Krättli, "Blaumützen in der Westsahara: Kein Ferienlager, Situationsbericht der Swiss Medical Unit (SMU)," in: *ASMZ*, 5/1992. Pressemitteilungen des EMD: 15 October 1992, 18 January 1993, 10 November 1993.

⁴⁷ Quoted from: Adrian Baumgartner, *Vortrag Swiss Medical Unit - MINURSO*.

transported almost 900 tons of material and over 5000 people, and flew 350 medical evacuations. Approximately fifty people were constantly working in Albania. Additionally, for the support of the operations the Swiss Government rented a transport aircraft from the Spanish Air Force and operated in cooperation with the forces of the United States, France, Spain, and Italy.⁴⁸

5. Swiss Engagements in UNMOT, UNTSO, UNOMIG, UNMOP, UNMIK, UNMIA, UNDP...

From March 1995 to October 1998 two medical officers and a medical assistant were stationed in Tajikistan at the disposal of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). Due to security reasons the Swiss medical team was temporarily withdrawn at the end of October 1998.

Swiss Military Observers have been in action since 1990. In March 2000 there were sixteen Swiss officers on mission. Eleven of them were engaged in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East; four served in the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and one in the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka in the former Yugoslavia (UNMOG). The Swiss were appreciated by all the parties for their diplomatic sensibility, their impartiality, and their reliability. In the beginning of March 2000 the Minister of Defense decided to send another two to four military observers to the Congo. The Swiss Defense Ministry also

⁴⁸ For additional details see: Walter Knutti, "Task Force 'ALBA,' Humanitärer Einsatz der Luftwaffe auf dem Balkan," in: *ASMZ*, 9/1999. Peter Soller and Igor Perrig, "Lufttransportverbände für Sicherheit durch Kooperation," in: *ASMZ*, 11/1999. Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung und Sport (VBS), "Operation ALBA verlängert," *Medieninformation*, Bern 23 June 1999. VBS, "Flugplatz Emmen: Bundesrat Adolf Ogi dankt den Teilnehmern von ALBA," *Medieninformation*, Bern 30

put at the disposal of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) one military liaison officer to KFOR and two data base logistics officers to the UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC). Furthermore, the DDPS sent another database specialist to the UN MACC in Azerbaijan and offered the United Development Program (UNDP) in Yemen a logistics officer.⁴⁹

6. The Swiss Atomic-Chemical Laboratory Spiez (AC-Labor in Spiez)

In the years 1984-1988 the AC Laboratory Spiez was assigned seven times by the UN to examine most diverse samples for chemical agents or agent arrears in Iraq and Iran. After the Gulf War and the formation of UNSCOM in spring 1991 until 1998 workers of the AC Laboratory participated in several missions. On several occasions a member of the AC Laboratory was the chief of the mission. During the destruction of identified chemical weapons various Swiss officers of the AC Laboratory were employed. Bernhard Brunner, a member of the AC Laboratory, wrote:

The work of the "Spiezer" was highly regarded by the UN. Occasionally, UN officials praised the reliability and highly specialized work of the laboratory. It was, however, not understood how a country like Switzerland, which was one of the few countries not in the UN, could make such a comparatively large contribution. What was even more

September 1999. Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, "Schweiz-Balkan: Entscheide des Bundesrates vom 23.6.1999," *Medieninformation*, Bern 23 June 1999.

⁴⁹ For details see: VBS, "Feu vert pour les observateurs militaires suisses au Congo," *Information aux médias*, Bern 2 March 2000. Adrian Baumgartner, *Factsheet: Swiss Military Personnel Abroad*. [<http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/GST/Peace/e/active2.htm>] 15 March 2000. Erwin Hofer, "Die Beteiligung der Schweiz an den friedenserhaltenden Aktionen der Vereinten Nationen," in: *Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik*, pp. 751-760.

astonishing, was that there were those who did not know or could not understand why Switzerland was not a member of the UN.⁵⁰

On 8 September 1997 Kofi Annan visited the AC Laboratory in Spiez in order to show his gratitude for its work in Iraq. In 1998, as a further acknowledgment of the work performed, the AC Laboratory Spiez was appointed by the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as a "laboratory of confidence," together with six laboratories from other countries.⁵¹

7. Swiss People Engaged by the UN

Switzerland assigned the diplomats Johannes Manz and Edouard Brunner as special representatives of the UN Secretary General on missions to Western Sahara and to Georgia. Under the direction of the UN, the Swiss Confederation organized peace talks in Switzerland between the leaders of the two Cypriot ethnic groups, and between the representatives of Georgia and Abkhazia. In 1994, Brigade General Peter Arbenz worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina as General Inspector of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The active Swiss participation in the Commission of the Human Rights led to the engagement of various Swiss as observers and correspondents in recent years:

⁵⁰ Bernhard Brunner, *Die irakischen Chemiewaffen, Hintergrundthema zu einem aktuellen Thema* (Bern-Spiez: AC Laboratorium Spiez, Gruppe Rüstung, Juli 1999).

⁵¹ For details see: Brunner, Bernhard, *Die irakischen Chemiewaffen, Hintergrundthema zu einem aktuellen Thema* (Bern-Spiez: AC Laboratorium Spiez, Gruppe Rüstung, Juli 1999). Nadja Schürch and Martin Schütz, *Biologische Waffen: Saddams tödliche Option, Hintergrundinformation, zu einem aktuellen Thema* (Bern-Spiez: AC Laboratorium Spiez, Gruppe Rüstung, Juli 1999). Martin Schütz, *Der Golfkrieg und die ABC-Waffen* AC, *Hintergrundinformation, zu einem aktuellen Thema* (Bern-Spiez: AC Laboratorium Spiez, Gruppe Rüstung, Juli 1999). "Beteiligung des AC Labors Spiez an einer UNSCOM-Mission im Irak," in: *ASMZ*, 9/1999. "AC-Laboratorium Spiez als designiertes Labor der OPCW," in: *ASMZ*, 9/1999.

the UN sent Professor Joseph Voyame to Romania in 1990, Professor Walter Kälin to the occupied Kuwait in 1992, the former Federal Councilor René Felber to the Israeli-occupied territories in 1993-1994, and Michael Moussalli to Rwanda in 1997. Michael Moussalli still works in Rwanda.⁵²

E. THE SWISS BALLOTS DEALING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Swiss Ballot in 1986: UN Membership

The violent and emotion filled ballot of 16 March 1986 – which many announced as “the ballot of the century” – ended in a debacle. 75.5% of the people and all of the cantons rejected entry into the UN, and thereby caused a defeat for the government and parliament. At that time a discussion started about the self-understanding of the Swiss, which still today shapes the ballots.⁵³

When in 1986 the Swiss people had a ballot on UN membership, it was also something new for the UN. For the first time, not a government resolution or representative-democratic decision decided a state's entry, but a popular vote.

The public debate regarding entry got off to a bad start. Public discussion of the issue started late, only in January 1986. On the one hand, the necessary money for the ballot fight came slowly together; on the other hand, the parties and federations made clear their opposition to Swiss entry. While the SP decided for a clear “yes” and the SVP for a clear “no,” the FDP and the CVP were completely split in the entry debate. The

⁵² The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, chapter 31, pp. 17, 19 and 21.

⁵³ Matthias Benz, “Ja zur Schweiz – Nein zur Welt? Rückblick auf die UNO-Abstimmung 1986,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12 December 1995.

SVP accused the Federal Council of not really informing the Swiss people, and it continued with its own emotion-filled campaign. It was unfortunate that on 27 February 1986 the Swiss Government decided to increase the tariffs on oil, natural gas and gasoline on 1 April 1986. The argument that UN membership cost too much suddenly moved to the center. In some instances it was assumed that the new taxes were only introduced to finance UN membership. The most important point in the last phase was the question of whether UN membership did or did not hurt Swiss neutrality. However, this question increasingly became a question of Swiss identity. According to the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* the idea of Switzerland as a "special case" controlled the debate.⁵⁴

In June 1986, the Swiss committee against UN entry, the CINS, was formed.⁵⁵ Until today, in the national policy of Switzerland the CINS has been underestimated as a factor in the debate. Already during its first meeting in June 1987, it called itself an organization set up to supervise the foreign policy of Switzerland, so that the Swiss neutrality was not diluted.

According to a study, the main arguments that induced the Swiss people to say "no" to UN entry were the question of neutrality, the costs and the thought that the UN pursued great power politics without success.⁵⁶ In addition, it was crucial that the Federal

⁵⁴ Matthias Benz, "Ja zur Schweiz – Nein zur Welt? Rückblick auf die UNO-Abstimmung 1986," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12 December 1995. In the discussion the "no-voters" went back until the battle of Marignano, and they quoted Niklaus von Flüe "keep out of foreign affairs" and "do not open the Swiss frontiers too wide."

⁵⁵ For details see: CINS, [<http://www.cins.ch>].

⁵⁶ Forschungsinstitut der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung, *VOX-Analyse, Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmung vom 16. März 1986* (Zürich 1986).

Council began too late with the ballot campaign, and was not able to inform the Swiss people about its goals.

2. Swiss Ballot in 1994: Creation of Swiss Troops for Peace-Supporting Operations (Blue Helmet Troops)

Just a few months before the ballot over the creation of the blue helmet battalion, in 1994, the Federal Council wrote in its *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90's*:

Two considerations argue strongly in favor of more active Swiss involvement on the international scene. First, Switzerland is exposed to the same risks and to the same dangers as every other country and, more particularly, as all of its European neighbors. Moreover, in view of the growth in needs of all kinds, the international community expects a prosperous country like ours to show greater solidarity. In order to enhance Switzerland's security in the 90s, we must agree to shoulder the following tasks:

To join the United Nations, which will demonstrate our determination to participate and to offer the resources needed to build a system of collective security and to pursue an active policy in favor of peace, over and above our previous activities. We also need to pursue this commitment within the numerous specialized UN agencies of which Switzerland is a member. It should be noted, in this regard, that in per capita terms Switzerland already occupies fifth place in the list of UN contributors worldwide.

.....

Switzerland will increase its capacity to participate operationally in peace-keeping measures, within a multilateral or – where this seems appropriate and realistic – a bilateral framework, by establishing Swiss “Blue Helmet” units.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*, pp. 22-23.

This statement did not reflect reality. With the Federal law on Swiss troops in peace-keeping operations, the Federal Council would have received the competence to offer the UN or the OSCE blue helmet troops in the size of a battalion. Against this law the referendum was taken, and in the ballot of 12 June 1994 rejected by 57.2 percent of the Swiss people. The ballot was of a certain importance, because it again concerned the location of Switzerland on the international playing field. It was regarded as a test of the ability of certain circles pleading for an opening to overcome the "tendencies of isolationism," which took place after the ballot about the European Economic Area (EEA) entry in 1992.⁵⁸

A crucial argument against the establishment of blue helmet troops were the finances that would have been made available for them. A second group saw Swiss neutrality as endangered.⁵⁹ A further group judged the blue helmet activities of the UN as useless.⁶⁰

The Federal Council for its part supported the law, because, it determined:

- blue helmets are in the security political interest of Switzerland.
- Only in a secure and stable surrounding field can our country be secure.
- With regard to foreign policy, blue helmets are in the interest of Switzerland, because nowadays a country is judged by the degree of its cooperation.

⁵⁸ Forschungsinstitut der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung, *VOX-Analyse, Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmung vom 12. Juni 1994* (Genf, 1994), p. 7.

⁵⁹ "Die Blauhelmvorlage im Meinungsstreit, Eine Dienstleistung im Rahmen der Neutralität," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 11 May 1994.

⁶⁰ Forschungsinstitut der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung, *VOX-Analyse, Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmung vom 12. Juni 1994* (Genf, 1994), pp. 18-20.

- Blue helmets fit in well with the humanitarian tradition of the good offices.
- They supplement Swiss military observers and medical units already engaged abroad.
- Blue helmets correspond to the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland.
- They save victims and help to relieve human emergency.
- Switzerland takes part only in peace-keeping operations. The participation in combat missions is legally forbidden.
- Blue helmets are impartial and are only used if all conflict parties agree with it. Thus, Swiss neutrality remains protected.
- Switzerland freely decides, in each individual case, to send or to withdraw blue helmet troops.⁶¹

The Federal Council also was supported by the Chief of the General Staff, Arthur Liener, who said in an interview, “We cannot keep preaching world ethics and morals and back out every time a concrete contribution to active peace is needed.”⁶² Liener explained in the interview that the activities of a Swiss blue helmet battalion were absolutely not new for the Swiss, who had already engaged in similar activities in the past:

The planned blue helmet commitment is absolutely not new ground for us: We have been making something similar for over 49 years! Think only of the neutral monitoring commission in Korea. There, Swiss soldiers had no blue helmets, but the whole surrounding field corresponded exactly to that of a classical peace-keeping operation of the UN; also in the Congo in principle we were stationed for the UN, we were in Namibia, we are in the Sahara, on the Golan, in Georgia, in parts of ex-Yugoslavia...⁶³

⁶¹ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Volksabstimmung vom 12. Juni 1994, Erläuterungen des Bundesrates, Bundesgesetz über schweizerische Truppen für friedenserhaltende Operationen (Blauhelme), Die Blauhelmvorlage in Stichworten*, in: [http://www.admin.ch/cvh/d/pore/va/19940612/explic/d-pp1600.html] 8 October 1999.

⁶² “Swiss Blue Helmets: An Act of Solidarity,” in: *Strategie*, 1/1994.

⁶³ “Generalstabschef Arthur Liener zur Blauhelmvorlage, Ein Zeichen der Solidarität and die Weltgemeinschaft,” in: *Strategie*, 1/1994.

Neither the Federal Council nor the military succeeded in convincing the Swiss people. On the one hand, the time to inform the Swiss people about the activities of the UN and Switzerland's long experience in UN activities time was too short. On the other hand, the activities of the UN relating to peace-keeping operations were too little analyzed. This also gave many Swiss officers the impression that the law of the blue helmet battalion was not up-to-date, not realistic, and therefore not practicable.⁶⁴

3. Swiss Initiative to Join the UN in the 21st Century

During the period from 1986 to 1993 the Federal Council did not discuss the possibility of a UN entry. At the end of 1993, however, it defined the goals of Swiss foreign policy for the 1990's and wrote in its report:

Both UN membership and accession to the EEA were turned down in referendums. The Federal Council accepts these decisions, in the knowledge that, in a direct democracy, the people's decisions are a basic means of legitimizing government policy decisions....The Federal Council has good reasons, despite the negative popular votes referred to earlier, to retain accession to the UN and to the EU as strategic objectives, even though it is well aware of how little sympathy many citizens currently feel for such a move....The Federal Council may thus find itself obliged, if the nation's interests so demand, to reopen the debate on solutions that have recently been rejected by the people or are bitterly debated within the country. The Federal Council believes that Switzerland is best served by the widest possible degree of political cooperation and collective decision-making at the international level. This explains the ambitious foreign

⁶⁴ For further details see: Hans Bachofner, "Die Blauhelmvorlage im Kreuzfeuer der Argumente," in: *ASMZ*, 5/1994. "Casques bleus suisses: pour la paix...de leurs âmes?," in: *Notre armée de milice*, May/June 1994.

"Blauhelm-Operationen – Ein Beitrag zum Frieden in der Welt, Eine kritische Bestandesaufnahme," in: *Schweizerzeit*, Schriftenreihe Nr 17.

policy goals (e.g. EU and UN accession) that the Federal Council has set itself. The Federal Council is convinced that the trend of events, both in Europe and worldwide, and the growing role of supranational forms of organization and cooperation are slowly hollowing out the sovereignty of a small country like ours....The Federal Council does not believe that strengthening of our links with Europe will weaken our identity on the international scene. On the contrary, as a multicultural state, Switzerland could provide Europe – and the United Nations – with the benefit of its invaluable experience....In so doing, it is fully aware of the need for permanent and open dialogue with the people and with Parliament.⁶⁵

Later, in 1998, the Federal Council repeated in its *White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations* the strategic goal of UN entry:

The UN is one of those places where Switzerland can pursue its foreign policy objectives and interests more effectively. Only wide-ranging international participation and collaboration will guarantee the success of Switzerland's efforts....In the application of sanctions, in its voluntary contributions to peacekeeping operations, in its additional considerable payments to UN organs, in its active commitment in all the areas described in this report, Switzerland meets most of the obligations of a UN member. However, at the same time, it denies itself the most important rights of UN members (the right to vote and to be elected to the General Assembly), and gives up the possibility of fully defending its own interests. If Switzerland became a member it would be able to fill these gaps. Membership would also mean:

- the legal obligation to implement decisions of the Security Council based on Chapter VII of the Charter,
- a political commitment to the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the different principal UN organs...

In presenting this White Paper, the Government wishes to support the renewal of discussion on UN membership. It sees this White Paper as a first step in preparation for entry.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*, pp. 36-37.

⁶⁶ The Federal Council, *A Swiss Government White Paper on Relations between Switzerland and the United Nations*, chapter "Conclusions," pp. 40-41.

There was in effect no dialogue with the Swiss people until 2000. From the end of 1998 until March 2000 the initiative committee for the entry of Switzerland into the UN collected signatures to change the constitution in order to create the possibility to become member of the UN. On 6 March 2000 the committee submitted to the Federal Chancellery over 125,000 authenticated signatures.⁶⁷ At the beginning, the committee had trouble collecting the signatures. This showed that the Swiss Government had failed to make a convincing case in order to achieve the strategic goal of the Federal Council. On the occasion of the press conference the initiative committee said that the knowledge of the Swiss population about the UN and its achievements was altogether modest; often the United Nations was confused with the EU or with NATO. Therefore, before the ballot much educational work would be necessary. At the same time they determined that a large majority of the population was in favor of UN entry.⁶⁸

Shortly after Josef Deiss became Federal Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999, he stressed several times the necessity for UN entry. The Swiss exceptionalism he called a "chronic anomaly," because Switzerland was member of all UN special organizations, and each year paid the UN several millions as for example 500 million Swiss francs in 1999.⁶⁹ In spring 2000, probably as a result of this campaign, the

⁶⁷ "Intensiver Schlussport nach harzigem Start," in: *Blue Window News*, 6 March 2000. [<http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/000306/000306c05.html>] 6 March 2000. *Initiative Committee UN Entry*, [<http://www.uno.ch>] 11 March 2000.

⁶⁸ "125'000 Unterschriften für den Beitritt zur UNO," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7 March 2000.

⁶⁹ "Zeit reif für UNO-Beitritt, Auch ohne Sammelerfolg der Initiative," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 15 January 2000. "Bundesrat Joseph Deiss spricht am "Dolder-Meeting" in Zürich, Nicht nur ein Anachronismus, sondern eine "chronische Anomalie" ist das abseits Stehen der Schweiz von der UNO nach Ansicht von Bundesrat Joseph Deiss," in: *Blue Windows News*, 25 January 2000.

Federal Council started to reinforce its determination to join the UN, and wanted to launch broad consultations in the summer 2000 on Swiss entry into the United Nations and, if possible, to send a draft proposal to Parliament before the end of 2000. At a closed-door session on 24 February 2000, before the initiative committee had collected all the signatures, the seven-member federal executive reaffirmed this timetable. In its view, Switzerland had to join the UN if it wanted to have a voice in international affairs and influence on global developments. The Federal Council wanted to start educating the public early, because the Swiss voter would ultimately decide the issue. The goal of the government is to join the UN by 2003.⁷⁰ The information of the Federal Council will be necessary, because the opposition, the SVP and the CINS, tries repeatedly to gain the support of the Swiss people against UN membership.⁷¹ For example, the National Councilor of the SVP and historian, Christoph Mörgeli, wrote regarding Swiss neutrality:

UN membership: an overhasty act of obedience! The Federal Council – empowered by a big parliamentary majority – is currently working out a communiqué on UN membership, an issue which the Swiss will be asked to vote on within the next four years. And yet we know only too well that the UN cannot, contrary to what it might protest, function as a collective

[<http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/000125/000125c18html>] 25 January 2000. For more details see: “Joseph Deiss bekräftigt Ziele des EU- und UNO Beitritts,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 29 October 1999. [<http://www.newswindow.ch/artikel/991029/991029c07.html>] 20 October 1999. “Der Bundesrat hält an seinem strategischen EU-Ziel fest,” in: *Basler Zeitung*, 29 October 1999. “Bundesrätliches Plädoyer für eine aussenpolitische Oeffnung,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 21 November 1999. [<http://www.newswindow.ch/artikel/991121/991121c07.html>] 21 November 1999.

⁷⁰ “Breite UNO-Vernehmlassung geplant,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 24 February 2000. [<http://www.newswindow.ch/artikel/000224/000244c06.html>] 24 February 2000. “Bundesrat treibt Arbeiten zum UNO-Beitritt voran, Klausur auf dem Gurten,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 25 February 2000.

⁷¹ “Nun sag, wie hast du’s mit der Union? Aussenpolitische Positionen der Bundesratsparteien,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 24 July 1999. See also the web page of the CINS.

security system, because it has no military resources of its own. It is either powerless, or merely an instrument in the hands of the United States of America. Collective security is incompatible with exclusive leadership by one country. No country, the USA included, has ever gone to war to see that right is done, or to punish wrongdoers; the only reason a country goes to war is because it believes that it is in its own interest to do so.⁷²

Every year, the chief of the CINS, the National Councilor Christoph Blocher, gives a special speech in Zürich, the so called "Albisgütli-speech," in his function as head of the SVP of the canton Zurich. In order to keep the Swiss people informed, he sent this speech to every household in Switzerland.⁷³ He will probably start another campaign as the ballot about UN membership approaches. He already advises strongly against UN membership.⁷⁴ In opposition to him the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs published in 1999 an informative brochure, written for the people, about the United Nations and its relationship to Switzerland.⁷⁵ But to get this information, the Swiss people have to order this brochure, which means that most of the Swiss people will never get this information. The question is, why does not the Federal Councilor act in a way similar to the SVP of the canton Zurich.

⁷² Christoph Mörgeli, *The essence of Swiss Neutrality*, [<http://www.cins.ch>] 11 March 2000.

⁷³ "Jeder Satz ist gut überlegt, Blocher über Sozialdemokratie und Nationalsozialismus," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 10 March 2000.

⁷⁴ In the middle of 1999, Christoph Blocher said in a party meeting that in the policy of neutrality the Federal Council did not present by any means the opinion of the majority of the people. "Switzerland never will join the UN," prophesied Blocher and harvested for it great applause. See: "Christoph Blocher gibt beim 'UNO-Beitritts-Hosenlupf' klar den Ton an," in: *News Windows alert*, 14 August 1999. [<http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/990814/990814c07.html>] 14 August 1999.

⁷⁵ Eidgenössisches Departement für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, *Schweiz global – UNO special*.

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IV. SWITZERLAND AS FULL MEMBER OF THE OSCE

A. SWITZERLAND AND THE OSCE: HISTORY AND GOALS

1. Swiss Policy from World War II to 1975: The Path of Switzerland to Helsinki

The idea of a European security conference was raised by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The first concrete proposal came in 1954. The Federal Council considered whether the Swiss could participate in a conference with all European states, and whether the conference would be compatible with Swiss neutrality.⁷⁶ In 1957 and 1958 further proposals were sent to Switzerland. The Federal Council in principle took a skeptical attitude to the one-sided Eastern requests for the summoning of a security conference. It did not express however a categorical no. A criterion that had to be met, was the participation of all European states, as well as the United States. Also the question of neutrality would have to be examined. In principle Switzerland stressed that, in the context of its tradition of good offices, it could offer itself as the host nation for the conference.⁷⁷ Nothing happened for several years. After the government of Finland also offered to be the host nation for such a conference, in 1969, the Federal Council again declared its desire to participate in such a conference under the condition that Swiss neutrality be respected. Contrary to this official declaration, the Federal Department of

⁷⁶ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, pp. 79-80.

⁷⁷ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, p. 80.

Foreign Affairs did not believe that such a conference could be successful.⁷⁸ Despite this skepticism, in the report about the Swiss relationship to the United Nations in 1969, the Federal Council showed a certain openness:

In order to give to the small state with extensive foreign relations the necessary flexibility, we should not set narrow limits on the policy of neutrality. The neutrality obligations are limited generally to international law and the military and leave to the Federal Council many possibilities for actions of international solidarity.⁷⁹

In the Council of Europe in 1969 and 1970, the Swiss delegation expressed various views. Some of its members wanted a security conference, while some of them did not. Renschler, a member of the Swiss National Council, even made the proposal to establish in Geneva a permanent secretariat. In his opinion, Switzerland should help to decrease tensions in Europe. He proposed a more active role for the Federal Council regarding the preparation of the conference. Additionally he said in the Swiss National Council:

We should pursue a policy of neutrality, which can be a valuable contribution for détente in Europe. The European security conference offers us such a chance; we must only take it.⁸⁰

The obstacles were overcome in the early 1970s by the Soviet acceptance of American and Canadian participation in the conference. The beginning of the

⁷⁸ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, pp. 85-86.

⁷⁹ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, pp. 80-81.

⁸⁰ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, pp. 91 and 92.

consultations in Dipoli on 22 November 1972 started the multilateral preparations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE). The Swiss delegation had the task of getting the proposal for a system of peaceful settlement of disputes on the agenda of the conference. Due to the activities and the independence of Switzerland, the Swiss delegation received the mission to survey the opinions of the various delegations. All the suggestions were summarized in four baskets. The Swiss draft for a peaceful settlement of disputes was set under the "security" chapter on the agenda of the planned conference. At the beginning the Swiss government did not want to take part in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MFBR) discussions. This opinion changed, however, after being influenced by the defense department, which welcomed the active cooperation of Switzerland in the development of so-called confidence-building measures, and Switzerland participated in the MFBR negotiation.

The CSCE formally opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973. Federal Councilor Graber, head of the Federal Department for foreign affairs, explained in front of all the foreign ministers the active collaboration of Switzerland in the CSCE process:

The reason, which has induced my country to participate so intensely in the preparation of the CSCE, stems from a desire related to our neutrality to consciously participate even more directly in the life of Europe. The Swiss neutrality is not an alibi for a policy of the empty chair, for indifference or a retreat on itself. It contains a spirit of solidarity, led from the desire to stand for the international society at any time in full extent of our possibilities.⁸¹

⁸¹ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, p. 126.

The next stage of the conference took place in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975 and constituted the substantive working phase. In Geneva, the Swiss delegation again presented its proposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes in a detailed draft agreement. The delegation noted that there could be no security and no continuing peace in Europe without an effective procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The principles of intergovernmental relations clearly required a mandatory system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Furthermore, with this initiative the most important basket, that of security, could be filled with a concrete proposal.⁸² Several neutral and Western countries supported this proposal, but the Soviets and the French were against it. The result of the negotiations was a compromise, which, however, flowed into the CSCE Final Act under the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was decided thereby that at the invitation of Switzerland an expert meeting of all participating states should be called up, in order to advance a generally acceptable model for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The last step in the negotiations took place in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975 and ended with the solemn signing of the Final Act. As Breitenmoser writes :

The fact that the Final Act was signed in Helsinki on Swiss national independence day, 1 August, and in the year that the minister of foreign affairs Pierre Graber was officiating as Federal President, was pure coincidence. It is not quite wrong nevertheless to see behind this double coincidence a certain symbolic strength. Switzerland shaped the conference process and the Final Act crucially. For the entire seventies

⁸² Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, p. 134.

active cooperation formed the outstanding element of Swiss foreign policy in the context of the CSCE process.⁸³

In the speech on 30 July Pierre Graber praised the conference results. He stressed the Swiss attitude and his joy that the policy of neutrality flowed into the Final Act "as a specific instrument of European security and co-operation."⁸⁴ Furthermore Graber stressed the importance of the principles of sovereign equality and national independence for Switzerland.⁸⁵

A majority of Swiss appreciated the speech. Nevertheless, a few observers called the Final Act incompatible with the principles of neutrality.⁸⁶ In general, the Final Act was accepted because key points such as democracy, human rights, sovereignty, and equality have always been important in Swiss history.⁸⁷ The Final Act of Helsinki could

⁸³ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, p. 10.

⁸⁴ Pierre Graber, "Ansprache von Herrn Bundespräsident Pierre Graber, Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes, in Helsinki am 30. Juli 1975," in: *Bundesblatt*, Nr 35, 5 September 1975, p. 918.

⁸⁵ Pierre Graber, "Ansprache von Herrn Bundespräsident Pierre Graber, Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes, in Helsinki am 30. Juli 1975," pp. 919-923.

⁸⁶ See James Schwarzenbach's article, in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 28 July 1975.

⁸⁷ For the Final Act see: OSCE Secretariat, ed., *OSCE Handbook*, 3rd ed. (Vienna: OSCE, 1999), p. 10: The Helsinki Final Act encompassed three main sets of recommendations, commonly referred to as "baskets". The first set (or basket I) was related to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relations between and among participating States (the "Decalogue", see below) and military confidence-building measures. The second set (basket II) concerned co-operations in a number of fields including economics, science and technology and the environment. The third set (or basket III) dealt with "co-operation" in humanitarian and other fields"- a formula covering human rights issues under the headings of "human contacts", "information", "co-operation in the field of culture", and "co-operation in the field of education". It also included a specific set of recommendations related to Mediterranean issues. Helsinki Decalogue: (1) Sovereign equality, respects for the human rights inherent in sovereignty; (2) Refraining from the threat or use of force; (3) Inviolability of frontiers; (4) Territorial integrity of States; (5) Peaceful settlement of disputes; (6) Non-intervention in internal affairs; (7) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience,

be signed by the Federal Council without being submitted for approval to the General Assembly and the Swiss people, because it concerned neither a treaty nor an international agreement. As a political declaration, the Final Act imposed no new obligations on Switzerland and did not limit existing rights.

2. From the CSCE to the OSCE

The Final Act of Helsinki also gave an impetus to the establishment of the so-called Helsinki associations. The Swiss Helsinki Association, founded in 1978, was based on the goal of reminding the governments of their obligations in the context of the CSCE. Today the national Helsinki associations are united in the International Helsinki Federation in Vienna. The forerunner of this union was the International Helsinki Association, established at the end of the 1970s in Switzerland, whose first president was the Soviet Dissident Andrej Sakarov.⁸⁸

The first significant results were achieved at the follow-up conference in Vienna from 1986 to 1989, where the participating states adopted a document containing many fundamental elements in relation to the human dimension, confidence- and security building measures, and conventional arms control. During these negotiations the neutral states played an important role as mediators. Due to its activities in the 1970s Switzerland was very often the leader among them.

religion or belief; (8) Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (9) Co-operation among States; (10) Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

⁸⁸ Eidgenössisches Departement für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (EDA), *OSZE Vademecum 1999* (Bern: Bundespresse, 1999), p. 5.

As a consequence of the conflict in Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union, the CSCE had to concentrate itself more and more on new issues of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, and crisis management. Thus, in 1992 in Helsinki the instruments of preventive diplomacy were strengthened, the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities was created, the position of the yearly-rotating Chairman in Office was established, and the Forum for Security Cooperation was created.

In 1994 in Budapest the institutions were further consolidated. The CSCE was no longer simply a conference. It increasingly assumed the character of an organization. Thus, the name was changed to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In the area of military security – an area in which the general staff of the Swiss Army is very active – a number of documents have been drafted and approved, including the so-called Code of Conduct and the new Vienna Document 1994 in order to strengthen stability and security in the OSCE region.

In summary, every step toward Istanbul gave Switzerland the possibility to work together with the other member states, because such key points as democracy, human rights, sovereignty, and equality have always been important to the Swiss.⁸⁹ Adrian Hyde-Price described the history as well as the importance of the OSCE in the following way:

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),

⁸⁹ For more information see: William Park and G. Wyn Rees, eds., *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe* (London-New York: Longman, 1998), pp. 23-38; OSCE, *OSCE Handbook*, pp. 7-19 and EDA, *OSZE Vademecum*, pp. 5-6.

is one of the great unsung success stories of modern European diplomacy. From its inauspicious beginnings in the early 1970s and through the heightened East-West tensions of the "Second Cold War," the OSCE has emerged as one of the central pillars of the post-Cold War European security system. For this reason alone, it merits more serious attention than it usually receives....These changes to the very nature of European international politics are creating a new security agenda in Europe, and require us to develop a new paradigm for the study of contemporary international security. Studying the OSCE can shed light on some of the key features of the new pattern of international politics and security in Europe, thereby helping us to rethink the nature of European security.⁹⁰

B. TWO ASPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE OSCE⁹¹

1. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration

Switzerland has traditionally entered into strong commitments in this area under the auspices of the OSCE, as already noted. Switzerland itself has had such a court during its long history of democracy. The principle of a peaceful settlement of disputes was included among the ten principles of the Final Act. However, a real breakthrough was not achieved until October 1992, when, at a meeting convened in Geneva, it proved possible to work out a "Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures within the OSCE."

The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration has its headquarters in Geneva. The Convention entered into force on 4 December 1994. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in Geneva was opened on 29 May 1995.⁹²

⁹⁰ Adrian Hyde-Price, "The OSCE and European security," in: William Park, *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe*, p. 23.

⁹¹ This chapter does not show the whole organization. In order to have an overview over the whole organization read OSCE, *OSCE Handbook*, pp.21-43 and EDA, *OSZE Vademecum*, pp. 8-15.

⁹² Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 42 and EDA, *OSCE Vademecum*, p. 21.

2. The OSCE within the Architecture of Security in Europe and the World: a Regional Arrangement of the United Nations

The member states redefined the OSCE's relationship with the United Nations at the Helsinki Summit Meeting in July 1992: the CSCE became a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, thereby providing an important link between European and global security. In addition to regular consultations, the creation of liaison offices and the exchange of official texts, this agreement provides for cooperation in connection with on-the-spot preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping missions.

Switzerland, which, along with the Vatican, is the only non-member of the United Nations in the OSCE, made a statement concerning the declaration of the CSCE as a regional arrangement which declared that "in the event of the Security Council utilizing the CSCE for enforcement action under its authority in accordance with Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations, Switzerland would have to decide on a case-by-case basis."⁹³

⁹³ EDA, *OSZE Vademecum*, p. 13: Although Switzerland is not a member of the United Nations, it pursues a foreign policy in keeping with the goals and principles of the United Nations. For that reason, it fully supports the declaration of the CSCE as a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. However, in the event of the Security Council utilizing the CSCE for enforcement action under its authority in accordance with Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations, Switzerland would have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether, and in what manner, it was prepared to participate in such measures.

C. SWITZERLAND AS CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE OF THE OSCE IN 1996

1. The Swiss Goals and the Reality

The report of the Federal Council on the foreign policy of Switzerland in the 1990s calls the tendency toward international cooperation and joint decision as a condition and guiding motive of Swiss foreign policy in the 1990s. It suggests using the CSCE as a political forum for security in Europe:

Switzerland is exposed to the same risks and to the same dangers as every other country and, more particularly, as all of its European neighbors. Moreover, in view of the growth in needs of all kinds, the international community expects a prosperous country like ours to show greater solidarity. In order to enhance Switzerland's security in the 1990s, we must agree to shoulder the following tasks: To employ the CSCE as a continent-wide structure for European security: there is need to extend its operational capabilities (above all in the area of preventive diplomacy), simplify its decision-making processes, and enlarge its financial and legal framework.⁹⁴

In the same report the Federal Council defined its security instruments and its goals. Concerning the CSCE the Federal Council wrote:

Switzerland supports the creation and expansion of the CSCE's operational capacities and the strengthening of its organizational structures. It is also in favor of closer cooperation between the CSCE and such organizations as NATO or the UN in common areas of activity, notably preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping operations. The key points in Switzerland's policy within the CSCE are participation in observation and surveillance missions, in negotiations on arms reduction and arms control and, within the framework of the security cooperation forum, measures designed to build confidence and security. Also to be added to this list are efforts to establish a system, binding wherever possible, for the peaceful settlement of disputes and, lastly, application of

⁹⁴ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*, p. 22.

the CSCE principles, notably respect for human rights and protection of minorities.⁹⁵

As a consequence of these goals the Swiss Government offered in 1994 to take the seat of the Chairman-in-Office for the year 1996. According to Hennig, who in 1996 was in Vienna as deputy of the German mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Switzerland became Chairman-in-Office because it was neutral and has no requirement for foreign alliances. Switzerland's reliability and its corresponding confidence rested upon its traditional policy of neutrality. Switzerland was seen as a non-partisan special manager and an impartial representative of a strong OSCE.⁹⁶

Federal Councilor Flavio Cotti, the Chief of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office for 1996, wanted as goals to concentrate on measures for conflict prevention and the new security model of the 21st century, to promote democratic values, to protect minorities, to improve the institutions of the OSCE, and to optimize collaboration with other international institutions.⁹⁷

The problem of the competition and the overlapping competencies between the OSCE and other international organizations remained unresolved. The initiatives of

⁹⁵ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*, p. 20.

⁹⁶ Ortwin Hennig, "Das OSZE-Präsidialjahr der Schweiz – eine kritische Würdigung von aussen," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller, Die Schweiz und ihre OSZE-Präsidentenschaft*, p. 153.

⁹⁷ See: speech of Flavio Cotti in front of the Permanent Council, 11 January 1996. in: Eidgenössisches Departement für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, *Schweizerische Präsidentenschaft OSZE 1996: Reden und Vorträge*, [<http://www.admin.ch/cvh/d/pore/va/19940612/explic/d-pp1600.html>] 8 October 1999.

Switzerland toward achieving a better division of labor frightened some people at first, but sensitized them to the problem. Obviously, many countries wanted no solution.⁹⁸

Laurent Goetschel concluded in its book *From a Passive Role to the Leading Actor – Switzerland and its OSCE-Presidium*:

The OSCE presidency showed that Switzerland is capable of carrying out an active and responsible foreign policy. It had also shown that Switzerland took pains toward achieving a breakthrough regarding its foreign policy interests in today's Europe. If the presidential term had contributed to making politicians and the public more aware of the tensions between myths and the safeguarding of interests, then it was not in vain. It will then also bring something to the foreign and security policies of Switzerland in the mid- and long-terms.⁹⁹

2. The Long-Term Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The exception to an ordinary mission is the one deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and whose tasks have been set down in the Dayton Peace Treaty.¹⁰⁰

At the end of January 1996 the Federal Council decided to place in the OSCE mission an unarmed military unit for logistical support. Originally, the Federal Council wanted to send blue berets in favor of the IFOR, but this was impossible, because IFOR

⁹⁸ Benedikt von Tscharner, "Aus Wiener Sicht," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 63.

⁹⁹ Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 194.

¹⁰⁰ (1) To supervise the preparation, the conduct, as well as the observation of the elections; certification of the conditions permitting them to be held; (2) To monitor the human rights situation (together with other international organizations), to nominate and furnish support to the human rights ombudsperson; (3) To lead the negotiations of the Parties to the Agreement on the subject of regional and sub-regional military confidence- and security-building arrangements, as well as arms controls. Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *OSZE Vademecum 8/1996* (Bern: Bundespresse, 1996), p. 19.

doctrine demanded armed forces. Sending an armed unit abroad, however, would contradict the military law of Switzerland.

The Swiss Headquarters Support Unit, as the Yellow Berets were and still are officially called, composed of unarmed volunteers, were and still are deployed in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Bihac, and Tuzla. Its task consists of providing medical support, postal service, ground and air transportation of personnel and material, and vehicles maintenance for the entire OSCE mission.

Switzerland sent more than 160 experts to serve as human rights observers, election experts, election observers, and as translators. In order to make possible free and democratic elections, the radio station FERN (Free Elections Radio Network) was developed. Switzerland wanted to bring in thereby its experiences as a multi-ethnic state, its long tradition of elections, and its sensitivity to minorities. The former Swiss national council president and ambassador at the Council of Europe in Strassbourg Gret Haller was appointed as Ombudsperson for human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Almost the entire Swiss commitment still exists today, which leads occasionally to personnel conflicts with other commitments.

The Swiss OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Flavio Cotti, told the OSCE Permanent Council on 25 June 1996 that the political conditions for free, fair, and democratic elections did not exist, but he recommended that the elections should be held in September according to the Peace of Dayton. Cotti had hesitated about this decision up to the last moment, despite solid American pressure on an early choice of date. In an speech Cotti condemned the serious violations of human rights in the run-up to the

Bosnian elections. Andreas von Kohlschütter, a member of Cotti's advisor staff and a member of the Refugee Election Steering Group of the OSCE, wrote about this speech:

In addition, Flavio Cotti's renouncement of cover-up and colorful rhetoric fit well with Switzerland as a multi-cultural European small state and its OSCE role. The Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs and OSCE Chairman gave way to the material-political obligations and gave the green light for the Bosnian September elections in 1996. But at the same time he sharpened the European understanding and conscience of the spirit of Helsinki....It was necessary to return to the balance between real and ideal politics due to the multilateral context of the OSCE.¹⁰¹

Cotti himself wrote about the elections after the year as president of the OSCE:

The holding of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina was both technically and organizationally, as well as historically and politically, a challenge for the OSCE. Here Switzerland could cooperate actively. Without its logistical support and without the commitment of the yellow berets, the fulfillment of this mission would hardly have been possible....The support of the democratization and nation-building process in Bosnia will still remain for a long time a central task of the OSCE and the international community.¹⁰²

3. The Long-Term Mission in Chechnya

The head of the long-term mission in Chechnya in 1996-1997, the Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldemann, was active as a neutral mediator, and the OSCE gave official approval to the agreements reached after lengthy negotiations in Moscow, Nazran, and Khasavyurt. The OSCE was the only international organization present in Chechnya, demonstrating its growing significance in contemporary European diplomacy. Until the

¹⁰¹ Andreas von Kohlschütter, "Die Wahlen in Bosnien – zwischen Prinzipien und Realpolitik," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 138.

beginning of 2000, the OSCE has still been the only international organization present. By accepting OSCE involvement in a conflict Moscow regards as a domestic matter, Russia conceded that its actions were matters of legitimate concern for all OSCE participating states.¹⁰³

In an empirical report about the OSCE supporting group in Chechnya, Tim Guldemann wrote that the reason for the success in Chechnya could be seen therein because the countries with the OSCE presidium – in 1996 Switzerland and in 1997 Denmark – were relatively small states. The warring parties estimated that these countries were neutral in these conflicts. For the same reason the chiefs of the mission – a Swiss diplomat and from May 1997, a Danish diplomat – were elected from these countries.¹⁰⁴ The OSCE group of supports did not hesitate to condemn the violations of human rights by the Russian armed forces and, for example, the taking of hostages by Chechnien fighters. From January 1996 until March 1997 Tim Guldemann traveled over thirty times from Grozny to Moscow and back. There were in addition to this pendulum diplomacy innumerable telephone calls and rounds of table talks on all political and military stages. According to Hennig, Guldemann's diplomacy became an effective instrument of conflict management.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. VI.

¹⁰³ William Park, *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe*, p. 34.

¹⁰⁴ Tim Guldemann, "Die OSZE-Unterstützungsgruppe in Tschetschenien – ein Erfahrungsbericht," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 124.

¹⁰⁵ Ortwin Hennig, "Das OSZE-Präsidialjahr der Schweiz – eine kritische Würdigung von aussen," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 164.

D. THE DUTIES AND WORKING METHODS OF THE OSCE: AN EXAMPLE OF SWISS ENGAGEMENT IN 1998¹⁰⁶

1. Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

Three persons were put at the disposal of the mission in Albania and four were sent to observe the referendum on the constitution.

Ronald Dreyer was put at the disposal of the mission in Bosnia as a Senior Political Counselor. For the monitoring of the general elections of 11 and 12 September 1998 eight supervisors and eight observers were sent. For human rights monitoring Ambassador Haller still was in charge as the responsible person. The Swiss Headquarters Support Unit played an important role transporting the election material. Further, the Free Elections Radio Network (FERN), developed by Switzerland, still operated as the only medium with inter-ethnic communication programming.

In Croatia Switzerland provided the mission head and the director of the regional office in Knin, and made available five mission members as well as four civilian police observers. In addition, the Swiss Government financed the project "Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations."

With the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KMV) Switzerland declared itself ready to provide altogether 50 to 100 persons. At the end of 1998 four civilian and seven military experts were there. Six ambulances were also given to the mission. Likewise,

¹⁰⁶ See details in: Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Schweiz in der OSZE im Jahre 1998* (Bern: EDA, 1999) and Generalsekretär OSZE, *Jahresbericht 1998 über OSZE-Aktivitäten* (Wien: OSCE, 1998).

Switzerland declared itself ready to expand the existing flying operation in favor of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, in addition to the KMV.

In Belarus, Switzerland made available the deputy of the consulting and monitoring group, Hanspeter Klein. Here it was concerned above all to be helpful to the authorities in the promotion of democratic institutions and in adherence to OSCE obligations.

Switzerland promised one million Swiss francs to the High Commissioner for National Minorities for the years 1999 and 2000. Together with the director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Swiss Gérard Stoudman, the High Commissioner convened a conference in Locarno, in order to study different forms of education and schools. One goal was to indicate to states ways to integrate minorities into the national decision-making process. Furthermore, Switzerland supported the Office of the High Commissioner through a donation of 50,000 Swiss francs.

2. The Human Dimension

The ODIHR observed elections in Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Hungary, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Switzerland made fifty-nine experts available for the observation of the elections. Ambassador Gérard Stoudman of Switzerland was made the director of the ODIHR. In Albania an expert provided from Switzerland compiled a draft for an Ombudsman law. The ODIHR employed a team of experts for torture prevention, to which the Swiss Danielle Coquoz was appointed as a representative of the International Red Cross (IRC).

3. Arms Control, Disarmament, Confidence- and Security Building

In May 1998 Switzerland got the presidency of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). This forum has its importance in the weekly meetings in Vienna. The FSC provides services for negotiations on arms control and disarmament and confidence- and security building, furthers consultations among OSCE participating states in matters relating to security and military affairs, and contributes to reducing the risks of conflicts.

In the context of a PfP workshop the FSC members developed a "codex of confidence" with included measures related to humanitarian international law and democratic control of the armed forces.

According to the framework in the Vienna document of 1994 a Swiss tank brigade was examined by Germany, and several military activities and installations were examined by Russia. Switzerland itself took part in thirteen CSBMs inspections abroad. Furthermore, specialists of the Swiss army helped in the context of the OSCE to inspect a radar installation in Lithuania.

In the context of the Dayton peace agreement a supervisor was made available for CSBMs. Additionally, one expert visited the seminar on "Military Support to Civilian Authorities" in Banja Luka. In the area of confidence-building, the DDPS explained to representatives of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, and the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina selected aspects of the Swiss security and defense policy. The CSBMs have proven their value as a practical means of security- and confidence-building.

**E. THE OSCE ON THE WAY TO THE 21ST CENTURY: THE SWISS
ENGAGEMENT - THE CHARTER FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY - THE
CHECHNYA CONFLICT**

At the Budapest Summit in December 1994, the OSCE States decided to begin discussions on a "common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century."¹⁰⁷ The proposal was made by the Russian delegation. In 1996, Switzerland had a dual role: As Chairman-in-Office it had to lead and moderate the discussions and present its own proposals. Switzerland had to inform the OSCE States at the Summit meeting in Lisbon in December 1996 about the new security model. Federal Councilor Flavio Cotti noted already at that time the fact that such a security model without Russia was not feasible. In January 1996, the security model committee created under the leadership of Swiss Ambassador Benedikt von Tscharner stepped into action in Vienna. After an inquiry in the middle of the year a discussion paper was prepared, which set up general principles for a security model and submitted it along with concrete suggestions for improvement. The security model, adopted in Lisbon, presented an intermediate result of a longer-term discussion process. It could not, however, fulfill all expectations. The adopted explanation contained a risk analysis, new principles for security cooperation, and a program for the work still to be done on the structure of a future European security architecture. According to Hennig, the main problem for the Swiss presidency, was the fact that the predominant part of the member states dedicated their attention to the enlargement of NATO, the results of the Russian presidential

elections, the results of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the American presidential elections. Another problem was that Russia very often gave the impression of working not on its integration into European security structures but to establishing counterweights to the West as means to assert its own position in Europe.¹⁰⁸

In 1997 Switzerland again participated actively in the security model discussion and brought in suggestions on measures to be taken in cases of the disregard of OSCE obligations and for the stabilization of the preventive-diplomatic instruments of the OSCE, as well as for the further improvement of cooperation among international organizations.¹⁰⁹ In addition, it worked for an improved protection of minorities.¹¹⁰

In 1998, Switzerland together with Canada put on the table a proposal, already presented in 1997, on the improvement in the implementation of OSCE commitment.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Linus von Castelmur, "Die Diskussion über ein europäisches Sicherheitsmodell für das 21. Jahrhundert – eine Priorität des schweizerischen OSZE-Vorsitzes," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 65.

¹⁰⁸ Ortwin Hennig, "Das OSZE-Präsidialjahr der Schweiz – eine kritische Würdigung von aussen," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, p. 167. See also: Linus von Castelmur, "Die Diskussion über ein europäisches Sicherheitsmodell für das 21. Jahrhundert – eine Priorität des schweizerischen OSZE-Vorsitzes," in: Laurent Goetschel, *Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller*, pp. 65-79. Andreas Wenger, "Ein Sicherheitsmodell für Europa im 21. Jahrhundert", in: Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Heiko Borchert, *Das schweizerische OSZE-Präsidialjahr 1996*, Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik 1996/97 (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse ETH Zürich, 1997), pp. 14-22, [http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/publ/bulletin/bull_96/b96_osze.htm] 10 October 1999.

¹⁰⁹ Swiss Delegation, "OSCE Platform for Cooperative Security, measures to develop OSCE practices in preventive diplomacy, Security Model Committee, 16 May 1997" (Bern: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1997, photocopied): "The question of how the various organizations and institutions work together and organize themselves in particular situations of conflict prevention and crisis management is a major problem and needs to be clarified."

¹¹⁰ Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Schweiz in der OZE im Jahre 1997*, p. 6.

¹¹¹ Delegations of Canada and Switzerland, "Assistance in the implementation of OSCE commitments Vienna 5 Nov 1997" (Bern: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1997, photocopied).

In July 1998 they, together with Germany, made a suggestion on the improvement of the protection of minorities, which presented solutions on how minorities could be integrated into the political process and on how to organize local autonomy.¹¹² Further requests pursued by it concerned the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in Geneva.¹¹³ This proposal was brought in together with the delegations of Germany, Croatia, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, and Sweden.

In November 1999, the OSCE States signed the Charter for European Security, mapping the principles and role of the OSCE in the 21st century,¹¹⁴ and the Istanbul Summit Declaration. It was important for Switzerland, as already at Helsinki, and now again at Istanbul, the OSCE States recognized the right to neutrality: "Each state also has

¹¹² Delegation of Switzerland and Germany, "Document Charter on European Security Elements Concerning Protection of National Minorities Vienna 10 July 1998" (Bern: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998, photocopied)

¹¹³ Delegation of Germany, Croatia, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland, "Proposal regarding advisory opinions by the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Security Model Committee, 19 March 1999" (Bern: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999, photocopied)

¹¹⁴ Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Charter for European Security* (Istanbul November 1999) [http://osce.istanbul-summit.org/charter_for_european_security.htm] November 1999: To implement this commitment, we have decided to take a number of new steps. We have agreed: to adopt the Platform for Cooperative Security, in order to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions, thereby making better use of the resources of the international community; to develop the OSCE's role in peacekeeping, thereby better reflecting the Organization's comprehensive approach to security; to create Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), thereby enabling the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations; to expand our ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the primacy of law; to establish an Operation Centre, in order to plan and deploy OSCE field operations; to strengthen the consultation process within the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council. We are committed to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible. The steps we have agreed to take in this Charter will strengthen the OSCE's ability in this respect as well as its capacity to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction.

the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards.”¹¹⁵

The conflict in Chechnya almost became a stumbling stone for the OSCE in Istanbul. The Swiss Federal President of 1999, Ruth Dreifuss, explained her support for adherence to international law. According to her, conflicts had to be resolved through negotiation. She called this “to act constructively.”¹¹⁶ Furthermore she called for a political solution to conflicts. Conflict prevention is the major task for the OSCE in the future.¹¹⁷ In the solution process of the conflict Switzerland again will take a more active role. In 1999 Switzerland made several efforts for the protection of the civilians.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ OSCE, *Charter for European Security*, p. 4.

¹¹⁶ “Dreifuss: Konstruktiv handeln,” in: *Tages Anzeiger*, 19 November 1999.

¹¹⁷ “Dreifuss: Konfliktprävention Hauptaufgabe der OSZE,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 18 November 1999. [<http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/991118/991118w23.html>] 18 November 1999.

¹¹⁸ “Deiss reist nach Russland,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 24 November 1999. [<http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/991124/991124c20.html>] 24 November 1999.

V. SWITZERLAND ON THE WAY TO NATO?

A. PFP

The Dayton Peace Agreement and its consequences created a favorable climate with regard to foreign policy in Switzerland, helping in 1996 to bring the Swiss into PFP.¹¹⁹ The Swiss Government sees participation in PFP as an important contribution of Switzerland to the European security order. Swiss participation is focused on democratic control of armed forces, training in humanitarian law, and in aspects of security policy, training of military observers, medical services, search and rescue operations, as well as on the support of the free flow of information.

1. Switzerland and PFP: From 1993 to 1996

Already in the autumn of 1993, when the United States launched the idea of the Partnership for Peace, Switzerland was one of the first nations expressing interest.¹²⁰ After the PFP Framework Document was presented in January 1994, the Federal Council formulated the basic conditions for possible participation, under which Switzerland would retain its neutrality, would not consider NATO entry, and would exclude participation in military exercises of a defensive character. The reservations were based particularly on considerations relating to domestic affairs. The nonparticipation in military exercises of a defensive character was considered for neutrality-political

¹¹⁹ The Swiss Government allowed NATO to take the land and air way to transport personnel and material through Switzerland, and as member of the OSCE, it sent the Yellow Berets to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

reasons.¹²¹ The interest of NATO in a partnership with Switzerland manifested itself in numerous expressions on the part of NATO. Thus, in March 1994, a NATO delegation presented Partnership for Peace in Bern. The American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, encouraged Switzerland to participate in Partnership for Peace as a model of a stable and neutral country.¹²²

On 12 June 1994, the Swiss people rejected the blue helmet ballot with 57.2 percent of the vote, and thus expressed themselves against a military contribution by Switzerland to peace-keeping operations of the UN and the OSCE. The Federal Council hesitated to advance the idea of participation in PfP, and established a working group in order to analyze the possibilities of Switzerland within PfP. In the end, this group came to the conclusion that participation in PfP did not conflict with Swiss neutrality and was compatible with the security policy goals explained in the *Report 90*. In January 1995, on the basis of the results of the working group, the Federal Council again discussed in a meeting the possible participation of Switzerland, without however making a decision. The reasons for postponing the decision lay not in the contents of PfP, but only in considerations relating to domestic affairs. The Federal Council still regarded an entry as

¹²⁰ "EMD ist interessiert an Kooperation mit der NATO," in: *Tages Anzeiger*, 6 November 1993. "Russland macht mit – und die Schweiz," in: *Der Bund*, 22 June 1994.

¹²¹ See: "Schweiz prüft Nato-Offerte," in: *Der Bund*, 6 November 1993. "Nur eine Plattform für Plattitüden?," in: *Der Bund*, 22 April 1994.

¹²² See: Pressemitteilung EDA, EMD, 11 March 1994. "Interesse der USA an Kooperation Schweiz – NATO," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 23 March 1994. For more information see: Christian Brönnimann, "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Mitarbeit der Schweiz im Rahmen des Partnership for Peace der NATO" (Diplomarbeit, Militärische Führungsschule Zürich-Wädenswil 1995), p. 28.

premature.¹²³ When, however, Austria decided in February 1995 to participate in PfP, the topic received more attention in the Swiss press.¹²⁴

The commitment of NATO in Bosnia played a crucial role. The Federal Council, even before the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, made a principle decision to permit NATO to transport personnel and material, designed for the engagement in Bosnia, through Swiss roads and airspace. Regarding neutrality the Swiss Government argued that this permission was unproblematic, because all conflict parties had signed the peace treaty. At the request of NATO, Switzerland made itself ready to offer specialists from medical, engineer, and rescue troops. However, since it was required that the troop contingents be armed for self-defense, the Federal Council had to withdraw the offer due to Swiss military law.¹²⁵ Instead of this support, the OSCE mission got a Swiss unarmed logistics unit in 1995.¹²⁶ All of these decisions gained popular Swiss support. Therefore the Swiss Government got a signal to go forward with a decision on PfP participation.¹²⁷

¹²³ Also the Council of Defense, a consultative organ of the Federal Council, asked itself whether, after the refusal of UN and EEA entry as well as the blue helmet ballot, the Swiss people would accept participation in PfP. An active communication between the government and the population was regarded as an important condition for a broad acceptance. See: Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Patrick Lehmann, *Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden – eine Chance für die Schweiz*, Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik 1997/98 (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, 1998), chapter "Eine Denkpause," p. 14, [http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/publ/bulletin/BULLE_98/B98_INH.HTM] 21 October 1999.

¹²⁴ For the whole paragraph see: Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Patrick Lehmann, *Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden – eine Chance für die Schweiz*, chapter "Eine Denkpause," pp. 13-15.

¹²⁵ See the sub-chapter "The Swiss Military Law: An Obstacle for Future Military Engagements Abroad?"

¹²⁶ See the sub-chapter "The Long-Term Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

¹²⁷ See: Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Patrick Lehmann, *Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden – eine Chance für die Schweiz*, chapter "Eine Denkpause," p. 15.

During a visit by American Secretary of Defense William Perry, on 2 February 1996 in Bern, the Federal Councilor Ogi, Minister of Defense, promised a decision before the end of 1996.¹²⁸ All political parties said “yes” to Swiss participation in PfP, but on different premises. For example, the SP was split in its decision, or the SVP welcomed a cooperation if Swiss neutrality was not endangered, and NATO entry was excluded. However, smaller parties and extra-parliamentary groupings criticized a possible PfP entry. For example, the CINS accused the Federal Council of ignoring the people’s will as demonstrated by the ballots in the previous years.¹²⁹

The parliament was concerned with the topic of Partnership for Peace in the autumn of 1996. Individual parliamentarians required that the parliament and the people would have to decide about PfP. The Federal Council disagreed with the demand to submit the decision to the parliament or the people, because it concerned a political initiative without international legal obligations and without a change of the policy of neutrality, and therefore it was constitutionally under the auspices of the Federal Council. The proponents, too, did not hold back their criticism of the Federal Council’s decision on participation in PfP. The Swiss Government was accused of having pushed the topic

¹²⁸ “Pentagon-Chef Perry bei Ogi,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 3 February 1996. Two months later, the defense minister said the same. See: “Schweizer Beitritt zur NATO-Partnerschaft?,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12 April 1996.

¹²⁹ AUNS, *Nato-Partnerschaft für den Frieden mit dem Volkswillen zur Neutralität unvereinbar*, Grauer Brief, Nr. 58 (Bern, 30 October 1996), p. 10.

into the foreground. But in the end, the Parliament said "yes" to the procedure of the Federal Council.¹³⁰

At the end of October 1996, the Federal Council decided to enter into the Partnership for Peace to help achieve its security policy objective of contributing to peace and security in Europe. Switzerland's involvement in PfP began with the formal signing of the Framework Document on 11 December 1996.¹³¹ Again, this careful policy of step-by-step was typically Swiss.

2. The Swiss Participation in PfP: The Presentation Document and the Swiss Organization

a) The Presentation Document

The basis for Swiss participation in PfP is the Presentation Document, which was submitted to NATO. On the one hand, it contains the objectives underlying Swiss participation. On the other hand, Switzerland reaffirms that it supports the generally acknowledged values upon which the Partnership is founded: stability and security in Europe, the protection of basic and human rights, and democracy. In the end, it is stated that Switzerland's participation fully accords with the objectives of Swiss

¹³⁰ Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Patrick Lehmann, *Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden – eine Chance für die Schweiz*, chapter "Widerstand im Parlament," pp. 18-19.

¹³¹ For detailed information on the period from 1993 to 1996 see: Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser and Patrick Lehmann, *Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden – eine Chance für die Schweiz*. Christian Brönnimann, "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Mitarbeit der Schweiz im Rahmen des Partnerhip for Peace der NATO" (Diplomarbeit, Militärische Führungsschule 1995). Josef Inauen, ed., *Swiss Army 2000, Armed forces and civil protection in Switzerland* (Frauenfeld/Stuttgart/Vienna: Huber Verlag, 1999).

foreign and security policy and corresponds with the armed forces' mission of contributing to peace, civil affairs, the prevention of war, and defense.¹³²

The principles underline the importance of Swiss neutrality related with the traditional Swiss policy of the past and the present. The Federal Council wrote:

Switzerland is committed to permanent and armed neutrality. It has no intention to abandon its neutrality and does not desire to become member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Switzerland's decision to participate in the Partnership for Peace is based on the desire to expand its co-operation for the promotion of security and peace with partner states, along the lines and in the spirit of its traditional policy of good offices and complementary to its engagement in the OSCE and in the Council of Europe. This decision is based on the recognition that such a participation in the Partnership for Peace is unreservedly compatible with Swiss neutrality.¹³³

Regarding Swiss neutrality and sovereignty, the Federal Council wrote on the same page:

The participation or non-participation in all activities within the Partnership is subject to the sovereign decision of each individual partner. If the Partnership for Peace should – contrary to the documents on which it is based – assume an alliance-like character, Switzerland would have to reserve the option to terminate its participation in the Partnership in order to safeguard the integrity of its neutrality.¹³⁴

The priorities of Switzerland in participating in PfP were in the areas where Switzerland traditionally had and still has experience and expertise:

¹³² The Federal Council, *Presentation Document of Switzerland for the Partnership for Peace*, 16 December 1996. [<http://www.nato.int/pfp/ch/d961217a.htm>] 3 March 2000.

¹³³ Ibid.

- democratic control of armed forces, civil-military co-operation, armed forces composed of more than one language groups, respect of minority rights and federal structures;
- training in humanitarian international law (especially the Geneva conventions and their additional protocols), its dissemination and strengthening, in particular by fostering compliance with these obligations;
- training in security policy for military officers, diplomats and civil servants from foreign and defence ministries;
- establishment of clusters of expertise in selected areas relevant to security policy;
- training of military observers;
- training in logistics for peace-keeping operations;
- medical services, search and rescue;
- promotion of the free flow of information;
- access to the expertise of the nuclear and chemical protection laboratory of the Swiss armed forces.¹³⁵

Furthermore, the Federal Council desired to focus its activities on training courses, seminars, conferences, and the exchange of information in these areas.

Regarding the military exercises, the Federal Council made one exception:

Switzerland is interested to send observers to some activities in which it might decide not to take part. It entertains the expectation that participation in partnership activities will also provide it with a better understanding of the work of international staffs. With respect to exercises the interest of Switzerland is focused on the military dimension of disaster relief, medical services, search and rescue. Switzerland excludes an active participation with troop units in field exercises with a collective defence thrust. All activities in which Switzerland takes part must be compatible with her neutrality.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

Examining the Swiss program makes clear that it lies in the tradition of Swiss political history. The history of the good offices is easily continued under another sign. In this connection, and in view of the fact that it is incomprehensible why the Swiss Government waited to enter until 1996. The Swiss population accepted entry was accepted as given without discussion.¹³⁷

b) The Swiss Organization and the Development of PfP After 1996

By virtue of its participation in PfP, Switzerland obtained observer status in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which at the end of May 1997 was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Switzerland joined the EAPC, because it did not involve any duties or obligations that were not already covered by the PfP Framework Document. For the Swiss Government it was important that each EAPC member was free to determine the extent and closeness of its collaboration. In joining the EAPC, Switzerland again made clear that it did not contemplate any cooperation in the area of defense or joint responsibility for military operations that might be involved. The Federal Council reiterated its position of armed neutrality, "which prevents it from contemplating NATO membership. As a participant in the EAPC, Switzerland's priorities are humanitarian actions and the International Humanitarian Law relating to war, the logistics of peacekeeping operations and the democratic control of armed forces." According to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, "Switzerland is

¹³⁷ In the newspaper, there could not be found any letters of readers.

particularly interested in improving co-operation between civilian and military personnel at times of international crisis and catastrophes.”¹³⁸

In January 1995, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) was introduced within the PfP framework, in order to advance interoperability and increase transparency among allies and partners. In 1998, the Federal Council decided to participate in the Planning and Review Process. The press release of the Swiss Government explains once more the Swiss desire to maintain neutrality as well as to contribute to international stability:

PARP will allow the Partners to benefit even more from the international experience in Peace Support Operations and disaster relief....Participation in PARP does not mean to make troops available for such operations, nor does it mean an obligation to participate in such common missions. Therefore, the Swiss participation in PARP is completely in line with the law of neutrality as well as with the policy of neutrality. But it is another clear sign to make a contribution to international stability....This certifies above all that the army should be in a position to participate with formations of volunteers in international disaster relief exercises and in peace keeping operations under the mandate of the UN or the OSCE. The Federal Council has to decide about such missions for the military. The principle of participation à la carte is still maintained. The lessons and experiences gained from PARP will facilitate preparation and training of army elements which might be employed abroad in peace keeping operations or disaster relief.¹³⁹

The Swiss Mission to NATO was established in 1997. Its main task is to represent Switzerland as a partner country to NATO. This includes participation in the

¹³⁸ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council*, [<http://www.eda.admin.ch/site/e/aussenpolitik/sicherheits/partnerschaft.html>] 3 March 2000.

EAPC and the development of the PfP program. The cooperation includes political, military and civil aspects. A Partnership Liaison Team at SHAPE in Mons is responsible for the management of the PfP program and acts as a military liaison office. The Swiss Mission to NATO is also a contact point to the WEU.¹⁴⁰

In 1998, the Chief of the General Staff reorganized parts of the General Staff, brought together all elements working with peace support, and established the Directorate for Peace Support and Security Cooperation, and within this directorate one section responsible for PfP, especially for the planning and control of PfP and PARP. In the beginning only one man handled the whole process, now there are about 8 people working in this section. The Directorate for Peace and Security Cooperation works closely together with the political groups of the departments. On the political side of the Federal Department for Defense, Civil Protection and Sports, the partner is the Permanent Office for PfP; in the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs there exists a similar organization.

¹³⁹ Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, *Press Release, Switzerland is going to participate in the Planning and Review Process of Partnership for Peace*, 21 October 1998, [<http://www.nato.int/pfp/ch/d981021a.htm>] 3 March 2000.

¹⁴⁰ For more information see the web-page of the Swiss Mission to NATO: [<http://www.nato.int/pfp/ch>].

B. THE SWISS ENGAGEMENT

1. The IPPs and their Realization: 1997-2001¹⁴¹

a) 1997, the First Year with PfP

The Presentation Document and the first Individual Partnership Program moved training programs, above all, into the foreground. In the light of Swiss tradition, these were harmless in relation to domestic affairs.

In 1997, Swiss cooperation was strong in democratic control of armed forces, humanitarian international law, security policy training, medical support, search and rescue training as well as arms control and disarmament. In 1997, Switzerland submitted eighteen offers and took part in forty-seven activities in PfP. The experiences in the first year of the participation were positive. The quality of the Swiss program, even if small, was found to be quite good. A total of 488 foreign officers, diplomats and experts profited from the program.

The emphasis lay clearly in the non-military participation. In the context of the EAPC, Switzerland cooperated in numerous specialized committees such as Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, Science Committee, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Economic Committee, Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, and Committee on European Airspace Coordination. It was recognized that increased cooperation had to be planned for military committees in the coming years, in

¹⁴¹ For this sub-chapter it is not intended to give a full overview about all activities, but the goal is to show the Swiss goals and to give an idea of their realization. For full information, the IPP as well as the annual reports have to be ordered at the DDPS.

order to get access to military information. In total, for the PfP Switzerland had to pay approximately 2.86 million Swiss francs.¹⁴²

b) 1998, the First Year of Consolidation

In 1998 Switzerland made thirty-five offers and took part in 180 activities of NATO or other partner countries. Altogether three million Swiss francs were spent on the activities in 1998. A total of 932 persons profited from Swiss-sponsored activities; and 213 Swiss officers and officials benefited from activities sponsored by other PfP partners.. The efforts of the Swiss commitment had remained the same.

Among other things, in 1998 the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Capability was created. It concerns a concept which creates improved conditions for the international cooperation within the range of disaster relief, if the civilian means in large emergencies are not sufficient. Switzerland was considerably involved in this concept owing to its international experiences.

The experiences of the years 1997 and 1998 showed that the army had to place an emphasis on interoperability within the cooperation ranges selected by Switzerland. For this reason, at the end of 1998 Switzerland decided to participate in the new PARP cycle. Within the range of PfP exercises with multilateral troop units, experience was gained by the participation of many Swiss observers.

In 1998, the Swiss participation in PfP and EAPC was widened and deepened. The EAPC proved for Switzerland, in particular in the Kosovo crisis, to be the

¹⁴² Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz an der*

most important multilateral information and coordination instrument. It permitted Switzerland to directly declare its requests and interests and to get important first-hand information.

Furthermore, Swiss participation strongly increased in the areas of security policy research, education, and information, which will be shown in the following subchapter. In 1998, cooperation with the Baltic States also was deepened. Thus, Switzerland took considerably part in the preparations for the creation of a Baltic Defense College in Estonia.¹⁴³

c) 1999, an Important Year for Swiss Security Policy and for Participation in PfP

In June 1999, the Federal Council published its report on the security policy 2000. In the context of the operation "ALBA," members of the army and three Super-Puma helicopters supported the UN refugee welfare organization UNHCR in its humanitarian task in Albania. As a result of UN resolution 1244, Switzerland took part in KFOR with a logistic unit in company strength for the international peace support mission in Kosovo. In 1999, the co-operation at the PfP Planning and Review Process began, in order to improve the ability in co-operation with NATO and other partner countries with peace-supporting operations and rescue missions. In addition, the existing arrangements were resumed and deepened.

Partnerschaft für den Frieden 1997 (Bern: Bundespresse, 1998).

¹⁴³ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden 1998* (Bern: Bundespresse, 1998).

For a set of Swiss actions within the humanitarian arrangements Switzerland could use its experiences, it had gained in the context of PfP. This was for example the case in connection with the humanitarian relief work for victims of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia and war victims, the operation "FOCUS," as well as with the air transports by Swiss army helicopters in operation "ALBA."

The spread and anchoring of humanitarian international law was from the outset of its participation in PfP a Swiss priority. Therefore, Switzerland made offers in education and referred to the meaning of humanitarian international law in political discussions. In the second half of 1999, Switzerland suggested a plan of action for humanitarian international law, which was taken up positively by the partners. This Swiss initiative is the reason why humanitarian international law now belongs as an area of priority in the PfP program. Switzerland also received support for this initiative from the parliamentary assembly of NATO,¹⁴⁴ whose associated member the Swiss parliament became in the same year.

d) 2000 to 2001

The Individual Partnership Program for 2000-2001 between Switzerland and NATO was approved by both parties in 1999.¹⁴⁵

From 1-10 Nov 2000, in Switzerland, there will be for the first time a PfP exercise with the engagement of about 400 officers and sub-officers representing about 30

¹⁴⁴ Resolution "Respecting and Ensuring Respect for Internationally Humanitarian Law" of 15 November 1999.

¹⁴⁵ For details see: DDPS, *IPP 2000-2001* (Bern: DDPS, 1999, photocopied).

nations from Portugal to Kyrgystan. The exercise "COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION" (CDE 2000) is a Command Post Exercise (CPX), and a Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX). Conducted on the level of a multinational brigade, the brigade staff as well as about nine battalion staffs will train within the scenario of peace support operation (PSO) and humanitarian assistance (HA). The aims and objectives of CDE 2000 are:

To enhance military interoperability for Peace Support Operations (PSO) and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations at the Multi-National Brigade (MNB) level. The exercise focuses on the following objectives relating to PSO and HA operations:

- to practice command and control (C2) organisation, process and procedures,
- to practice the planning and coordination of land tasks,
- to practice the planning and coordination of airlift, airdrop, SAR and AEROMEDEVAC operations in support of land operations,
- to understand the interoperability requirements for logistical support,
- to understand procedures for civ-mil co-ordination in the field,
- to practice refugee control procedures.¹⁴⁶

For the first time, Switzerland will be the host nation for such an exercise. This will be another good chance to present the ideas and goals of Switzerland in Europe as well a good exercise for the Swiss Armed Forces with request to further engagements.

¹⁴⁶ Andreas Schär, *CDE 2000, Briefing PCC-Shape* (Bern: SCOS, Generalstab, 2000, photocopied).

2. The Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SPN), Switzerland and PfP, Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSA)

The Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research is based at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. It is an independent academic institution doing research and teaching in the fields of national and international security policy and conflict analysis.¹⁴⁷

The International Relations and Security Network (ISN),¹⁴⁸ an electronic service of the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, was started in 1994. In 1996, it became an official part of Switzerland's participation in PfP. The ISN is the leading internet-based network of electronic services in the fields of international relations and security policy, and promotes the free flow of unclassified information in the described fields. It consists of six parts: links library, limited area search, current world affairs survey, educational modules, security forum and facts and figures.¹⁴⁹ With ISN Switzerland applies high technology to the strategically important area of information management and distribution in the context of PfP. NATO and PfP partners are interested in a further development of this system.¹⁵⁰ In 1998, the number of the formal

¹⁴⁷ For more information see the web-page of the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research: [<http://www.fsk.ethz.ch>].

¹⁴⁸ Web-page: [<http://www.isn.ethz.ch>].

¹⁴⁹ Center for Security and Conflict Research, *ISN, International Relations and Security Network, a Pioneering Service on the Internet, Swiss Contribution to Partnership for Peace, information brochure* (Zurich: ETHZ, no date).

¹⁵⁰ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden 1998*, p. 28.

partner organizations rose from ten to thirty-four and includes today, in the area of security politics and peace promotion, numerous leading institutes of the world.¹⁵¹

The Center for Security Policy and Conflict Research at the ETH Zurich also maintains a network related to ISN issues of Swiss foreign and security policy. The page serves as a clearing-house for information. Among other things it contains a links library of both governmental and academic resources and an online chronology of Swiss security policy.¹⁵² In 1998, this service was re-arranged as a contribution to PfP, and is considered “an important milestone of ISN.”¹⁵³

Another “milestone” of ISN was the creation of the web page *Switzerland and Partnership for Peace* in 1998.¹⁵⁴ This service provides general information about Swiss participation in PfP, and contains detailed information on the Partnership’s activities, as well as on Swiss participation and offers. For better information, in 2000 this web page will be overhauled, and will be presented in a completely new style.

As Switzerland decided to strengthen its involvement in humanitarian de-mining by establishing the Geneva International Center of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Center for Security Policy had to develop the Information Management System for Mine

¹⁵¹ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden 1998*, p. 28.

¹⁵² Web-page: [<http://www.spn.ethz.ch>].

¹⁵³ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden 1998*, p. 27.

¹⁵⁴ Web-page: [<http://www.pfp.ethz.ch>].

Action (IMSMA). The IMSMA provides the UN as well as NATO with improved capabilities for decision-making and information policy related to mine actions.¹⁵⁵

3. Geneva: Center for Security Policy: PfP Training Center (GCSP)

The Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation, created under the framework of Swiss participation in PfP. The foundation members include: Switzerland, the Canton of Geneva, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Republic of Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, Ukraine, and the United States of America. The GCSP has three core missions:

to provide expert training in international security policy for diplomats, military officers and civil servants from foreign and defense ministries;

to define, contribute and advance research in international security studies and to organize conferences and seminars accordingly;

and to foster cooperative networking with all countries, institutions and experts working in this area.¹⁵⁶

The primary activity of the GCSP is “to provide expert training in international security policy for diplomats, military officers and civil servants from foreign and defense ministries. The GCSP training program seeks to promote the strengthening of peace, stability and security, and international cooperation by focusing on the new challenges of

¹⁵⁵ For more information see: Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden 1998*, p. 28 and *Information Management System for Mine Action*, [<http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/imsma.htm>].

¹⁵⁶ Geneva Center for Security Policy, [http://www.gcsp.ch/gcsp_ind.htm] January 2000.

the post-Cold War world, which range from new dimensions of security policy to crisis management and conflict resolution.”¹⁵⁷ The “flagship course of the GCSP” is the nine-month International Training Course (ITC). The ITC provides in-depth training in all major areas of international security policy, preventive diplomacy, and arms control. Each year about twenty-five participants, representing about twenty NATO and PfP member states, join this course. In addition, among other courses, the GCSP conducts a three-month course on European security policy (ETC). In 2001 there will be offered a second three-month course, the Course on New Issues in International Security (NIC), dealing with such themes as proliferation, terrorism, international crime, migration, refugees, and PSO.

Every year, the GCSP trains over 100 participants from about thirty countries, and maintains an active “alumni” network that is brought together at annual security policy conferences. The United States declared that a visit by the GCSP has the same value as the visit by the US War College.¹⁵⁸ In 1999 at the summit in Washington, the GCSP, as one of the leading security policy institutions, was named a “PfP Training Center.” Due international demand, the training offer will be gradually augmented, starting in 2000.

¹⁵⁷ Training Activities GCSP: [http://www.gcsp.ch/engl/e_docs/about_e.htm] January 2000.

¹⁵⁸ “Genfer Zentrum für Sicherheitspolitik,” in: *ASMZ*, 1/2000.

4. Geneva: International Center for Humanitarian Demining

The Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD),¹⁵⁹ founded in 1998, started in 1999 with a contribution in to KFOR. On the occasion of a meeting in the center in Geneva, the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) decided to use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which was developed at the ETHZ in cooperation with the GICHD for the United Nations. This information management system is administered for the UN in twenty countries, which deal with the problem of the anti-personnel mines. At the request of KFOR, the software was configured especially for their requirements and adapted to the terrain of Kosovo. This system permits a systematic collection, analysis, and a further spread of all necessary information within the range of the humanitarian demining operation in Kosovo. In the second half of 1999 this system was installed in Kosovo, and the specialists of KFOR were trained on it.¹⁶⁰ Within the EAPC the GICHD became a clearing-house.

5. Operation SWISSCOY¹⁶¹

On 23 June 1999, the Swiss Government decided to take part in the peace-keeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR), which is based on UN resolution 1244 and led by NATO.

¹⁵⁹ For more information about the GICHD see the sub-chapter "A New Swiss Foundation: The International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)."

¹⁶⁰ VBS, "Das Internationale Zentrum für Humanitäre Minenräumung – Genf beteiligt sich am Kampf gegen die Minen in Kosovo," *Medieninformation*, Bern, 18 June 1999.

¹⁶¹ For a short summary see: *Swiss Company, Swiss Participation within the Kosovo Force KFOR*, [<http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/gst/peace/e/fachtsheet-SC.htm>] 20 February 2000.

This participation is not to be seen as an isolated act, but as part of the policy to deal with the refugee problem in Switzerland and to organize immediate help in Kosovo.

The Swiss Company, called SWISSCOY, consists of 160 military but mostly unarmed volunteers. The tasks of SWISSCOY lie within the logistical support for the Austrian battalion (AUCON); both together are placed in the sector of the Multinational Brigade South, which is under the authority of the German Armed Forces. SWISSCOY is neither placed under NATO nor under the AUCON command. The command as well as the staff and disciplinary authority is under Swiss control. SWISSCOY concentrates on the logistical support for AUCON in the following fields: set-up of camps, special transports, water processing and supplies, medical help and engineering.

In accordance with the Swiss military law, armed fortification guards escort SWISSCOY to guarantee minimal security. Also in accordance with Swiss military law individuals may be equipped with assault rifles and pistols if required, but not every soldier is automatically equipped with a personal weapon.¹⁶² AUCON takes care of general security.

Since the end of August 1999, a detachment of fortification guards prepared the Swiss camp within the KFOR compound "Casablanca" near Suva Reka. About 300 containers and over 100 vehicles were brought into Kosovo by plane and three convoys. The deployment was finished as planned 8 October 1999. The SWISSCOY mission is limited until the end of the year 2000 and may be extended by mutual agreement.

¹⁶² For more information about this problem see the sub-chapter "The Swiss Military Law: An Obstacle for Future Military Engagements Abroad."

C. ACTIVITIES "IN THE SPIRIT OF PFP"

One chapter of the PARP Survey gives an overview of the Swiss activities "in the spirit of Pfp" and shows that these activities started before Pfp was created:

Co-operation between Switzerland, NATO and other Partners involves armed forces, civil defence, disaster relief, air operations, police and customs control. The armed forces were involved in the bilateral exercises "BRÜCKENSCHLAG" (with the Federal Republic of Germany), "LEMAN" (with France), "RHEINTAL" (with Austria) and the air force exercises "MOTHA", and "DIATT" (with France). Within the framework of its bilateral assistance programmes, we put particular emphasis on South Eastern Europe (mainly Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and the Baltic Sea region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). We offer training in security policy, training of military personnel in the areas of defence-related legislation and military justice, and contribute non-lethal material to the armed forces of these countries.¹⁶³

In 1995, before Switzerland joined the Pfp the exercise "BRÜCKENSCHLAG" between Germany and Switzerland was dedicated to managing catastrophes, and included about 600 officers, sub-officers, and soldiers.¹⁶⁴ In 1997, the exercise "LEMAN" engaged about 1500 civil and military personnel from France and Switzerland. A similar exercise between both countries was held in 1999 in Seyssel, in France. At the end of both exercises, the Swiss commander, Mayor General Liaudat, as well as the French General Lorioz said:

¹⁶³ DDPS, *PARP between NATO and Switzerland: Pfp-Planning and Review Process Survey of overall Pfp Interoperability – 1999, 22 February 1999* (Bern: DDPS, 1999, photocopied), p. 17.

¹⁶⁴ Center for Security and Conflict Research, *SPN Chronologie, Verteidigungspolitik: Schweizerisch-deutsche Katastrophenhilfe-Übung, 27 June 1995*, [http://www.spn.ethz.ch/chrono_adv.cfm] 10 January 2000.

It is our obligation to continue efforts of the past. The international cooperation must be strengthened, both within the ranges already practiced and in further activities, which can be specified by the different partners....A first step was made, further developments are intended for the years 2000 and 2001 with the common goal of security through co-operation.¹⁶⁵

In 1999, in the exercise "RHEINTAL," Swiss and Austrian officers trained on interoperability at the division level. The bi-national ad hoc brigade staff trained itself in topics such as streams of refugees, terrorism, and operations-other-than-war, in order to master tasks in peace-keeping activities.¹⁶⁶ Federal Councilor Ogi called this exercise "a further milestone of military co-operation." The Austrian Federal Minister Fasslabend called the exercise "representative of a new area in which solutions to new risks and dangers can very often only be found through trans-national cooperation."¹⁶⁷

For years, the Swiss Air Force has been training with foreign countries to demonstrate the Swiss ability to promote security through cooperation. For example, in October 1999, the Swiss Air Force trained with France and Austria in the exercise "AMADEUS 99." Of this exercise the commander of the Swiss Air Force said: "the frontiers of Swiss neutrality are more flexible than many people in Switzerland think."¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Jean-Michel Landert, "*Leman 99*": Bilanz, [http://www.vbs.admin.ch/verband/terdiv1/d/info/flash99/dexercice.htm] 10 February 2000.

¹⁶⁶ Charles Ott, "Interoperabilitätsübung 'RHEINTAL,' Bi-nationale Stabsrahmenübung der Schweizer und der österreichischen Armee," in: *ASMZ*, 1/2000.

¹⁶⁷ Bruno Lezzi, "Weiterer Meilenstein militärischer Kooperation, Schweiz-österreichische Stabsrahmenübung," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 10 November 1999.

¹⁶⁸ "Grenzen der Neutralität sind flexibel," in: *Blue Windows News*, 19 October 1999. For further information see: "*Amadeus 99*," *Trilaterale Übung zur Verbesserung der Zusammenarbeit und Sicherheit in der militärischen Luftfahrt*, [http://www.bmlv.gv.at/aktuell/amadeus-99/99-10-13-amadeus-page-1.html] October 1999.

Former Commander of the Swiss Air Force, Fernand Carrel, said upon his retirement at the end of 1999:

The operation in Albania highlighted the importance of working together. Swiss military fliers have contacts with twenty-two Air Forces, which are fixed in sixteen bilateral cooperation agreements. Without the initial assistance of French, Spanish and American friends the Swiss Super-Pumas would have had to return to Switzerland because of logistical problems, without having done anything.¹⁶⁹

Since 1998 Switzerland has been observer in "COMBINED ENDEAVOR" and in 2000 it became a full member of this process. In recent years, "COMBINED ENDEAVOR" has become the benchmark for Communications and Information System (CIS) interoperability testing. Its popularity and influence continue to grow because of both the published results and the high degree of PfP/NATO involvement.¹⁷⁰

All these exercises "in the spirit of PfP" are another sign of the Swiss desire and ability to demonstrate its effort toward achieving "security through cooperation."

D. CENCOOP: A MULTINATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO PFP OUTSIDE FROM PFP?

On 19 March 1999 the head of the DDPS, Federal Councilor Ogi, signed in the name of the Federal Council a Letter of Intent for the participation of Switzerland in the Central European Nations' Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP). According to Herbert Amrhein, an official of the DDPS, for the first time Switzerland takes part as a

¹⁶⁹ "Von Carrel zu Fehrlin, Kommandoübergabe bei der Luftwaffe in Payern," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 3 December 1999.

full member in a multinational program, by which regional cooperation seeks to meet more efficiently and more cost-effectively the challenges of future peace-supporting operations and disaster relief.¹⁷¹ The other participating states are Austria, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

In the spirit of articles V and VIII of the UN Charter CENCOOP was created as “an improved and more flexible instrument” for peace-keeping measures.¹⁷² Furthermore, its special capabilities are to be made available for engagements in the framework of the UN and the OSCE. The interoperability of the involved states has to be optimized. CENCOOP relies on the so-called Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, after which task forces can be organized from pre-established multinational units according to mission requirements. Armed formations can be used like unarmed individuals for military and humanitarian assistance. The self-determination of the participating countries is ensured. The development of co-operation gradually takes place and generally depends on the PfP standards. However, according to statements of the DDPS it is not meant as a competition to PfP.

The cooperation mechanism covers the meeting of the Secretaries of Defense at the political level. As preparing and implementing organs act the Steering Committee, and the Coordination Group. In addition, various experts work as team. A multinational

¹⁷⁰ “COMBINED ENDEAVOR 99, After Action Report, 1 July 1999” (Bern: Untergruppe Führungsunterstützung, Generalstab, 1999, photocopied).

¹⁷¹ Herbert Amrhein, “Schweiz: Mitglied bei Central European Nations’ Cooperation,” in: *Swiss Peace-Keeper*, 2/99. For more information see also: [<http://www.bmlv.gv.at>].

Planstaff is active as a permanent mechanism in Vienna. In 1999, Switzerland participated regularly in all meetings and was represented in the Planstaff by a logistics officer. First PSO staff exercises and "COMMAND post office Exercises" in the multinational framework are intended and conceptional in preparation for 2000 and 2001.

According to a fact sheet of the DDPS, this cooperation corresponds to Swiss interests, because

- a broad range of cooperation possibilities is offered,
- the PfP à la carte principle worked satisfactorily and is ensured,
- the initiative is complementary and not in competition to PfP,
- there exists no contradiction and no duplicity to the Planning and Review Process (PARP),
- it is from the point of neutrality legally and politically harmless,
- it lies in our military interest of training (interoperability),
- the participation in CENCOOP strengthens our good neighborly relationship with Austria.¹⁷³

Compared with that of other PfP countries the Swiss contribution to PfP is modest. Furthermore, the Swiss system of the militia armed forces with a small professional core and a relatively small administration permits only a limited growth in the commitment. Parallels between CENCOOP and PfP are obvious. Beside PfP, CENCOOP has the character of a regional agreement with purposeful intergovernmental or interregional optimizations. For Switzerland the question arises whether, in the sense of concentration of the forces, a more optimized commitment to PfP and

¹⁷² Herbert Amrhein, "Schweiz: Mitglied bei Central European Nations' Cooperation," in: *Swiss Peace-Keeper*, 2/99. For more information go to: [<http://www.bmlv.gv.at/>].

¹⁷³ Herbert Amrhein, *Central European Nation's Cooperation (CENCOOP), Fact Sheet* (Bern: DDPS, October 1999, photocopied).

intergovernmental exercises like the exercise "RHEINTAL" would bring better results. This also shows up in the fact that the exercise "RHEINTAL" was not a planning exercise of CENCOOP. The question also arises whether Switzerland can make the appropriate people available – mostly they are the same as in PfP –, as written in the *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung* (ASMZ):

In the context of future CENCOOP activities Switzerland has to send officers with staff experience. They must not only possess a very good knowledge of English – the key to cooperation and interoperability is English! – but they must also have the ability to think conceptually.¹⁷⁴

E. THE FUTURE

1. PfP in General

Due to the 1994 rejection of the blue helmet battalion the full arming of Swiss peace troops for self-defense was no longer possible. This prevented, already before the entry to the PfP program, participation in IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to the same circumstance, participation in PfP exercises, which featured armed employment, was not possible. This also prevented Switzerland from sending officers to regional NATO commando staffs, an opportunity for all PfP partners, and one frequently takes up by other neutral states.¹⁷⁵

Since 1995, the attitude of the Swiss population toward PfP has been positive – indeed, has grown in popularity. The employment in Kosovo can be regarded as a milestone in the new Swiss security policy. Eighty-one percent of all Swiss who were

¹⁷⁴ "Bericht aus dem Bundeshaus, Central European Nations Cooperation," in: ASMZ, 6/1999.

¹⁷⁵ "Unterschiedliche Konzepte der neutralen Staaten," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30 March 1999.

asked endorsed the commitment made with SWISSCOY.¹⁷⁶ The ballot on Swiss Military Law will show if Switzerland is able to take further steps within PfP. It will also show if the Swiss Government can convince the Swiss people about the necessity of arming troops for self-defense.

2. Army XXI (Interoperability)

In spring 1999, in the dialogue with NATO on PARP, twenty-five interoperability goals were decided for Switzerland. These are to be achieved by the year 2003. These interoperability goals cover, above all, the areas of command and control, aspects of logistics and air transport, medical and rescue engagements, as well as language training regarding military terminology, signatures, and map symbols.¹⁷⁷

Already the *Report on Security Policy 2000* demands interoperability.¹⁷⁸ The decision that the Swiss Armed Forces must become interoperable has subsequently been

¹⁷⁶ Karl W. Haltiner and others, *Sicherheit 1999, Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend* (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich und Militärische Führungsschule an der ETH Zürich, 1999), pp. 103 and 113.

¹⁷⁷ See: DDPS, *PARP: Interoperability Objectives for Switzerland* and Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden 1999* (Bern: Bundespresse, 2000).

¹⁷⁸ "The execution of the three missions requires that all armed forces personnel receive good basic military training, and an improvement of the armed forces' multi-functionality and of their international interoperability, as well as far-reaching structural and qualitative reforms. Not least, the armed forces' capability to fulfil their missions depends on the resources put at their disposal." In: Swiss Federal Council, *Report on the Security Policy of Switzerland*, p. 46.

made. In 1999 a first study was written pointing out the areas in which the Swiss Armed Forces have to be made interoperable.¹⁷⁹

3. Switzerland as Member of NATO

In October 1992 Federal Councilor Villiger communicated that Switzerland has to participate in international efforts to create security. Villiger judged the participation of Switzerland in a system of collective security quite possible; he rejected, however, the entry into a defense alliance for reasons relating to domestic affairs.¹⁸⁰

The perspective of development in the Switzerland-NATO relationship in the foreseeable future envisions no NATO entry for Switzerland. Further development within PfP is still possible and does not automatically require NATO membership. Ambassador Anton Thalmann, the project manager of the *Report on the Security Policy of Switzerland* and today's mission head at NATO in Brussels, wrote in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*:

There is still substantial room for a pragmatic development of our cooperation within the European security structures, without raising the question of entry into alliances. Such a step would only be considered if it meant substantially more security for Switzerland.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, "Interoperabilität – Prospektivstudie zuhanden des Kernteams Armee XXI," (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich 1999, photocopied). See also: "Interoperabilität – Eckwert für die Armee XXI, Voraussetzung für alle Optionen militärischer Kooperation," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 19 October 1999.

¹⁸⁰ Bruno Lezzi, "Schweizer Sicherheitspolitik in Europa, ein Symposium an der ETH Zürich," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29 October 1992.

¹⁸¹ Toni Thalmann, "Unterschiedliche Konzepte der neutralen Staaten, Das Verhältnis der Schweiz zur atlantischen Allianz," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30 March 1999.

In the *Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland* the Federal Council denied a possible entry in NATO. According to it “it is not necessary to join NATO in order to ensure our security and stability in our region.” Additionally it wrote:

Our commitment to cooperative security, but without joining the euro-atlantic collective defence, is appropriate for the current and foreseeable threat situation. To the extent that we desire to cooperate with NATO, and are able to do so taking into account the law of neutrality, such cooperation takes place through our membership in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and our participation in Partnership for Peace. Without in any way forcing them to join the Alliance, NATO is increasingly prepared to offer those partner states willing and able to do so – e.g., Finland and Sweden – options for extensive participation in the preparation and execution of peace support and humanitarian operations. If it so desires Switzerland can hence also make its own contributions to, and preserve its interests in, NATO operational activities. Considering the nature of today’s threats and dangers there are no negative repercussions for our security that result from Switzerland not being a member of NATO and therefore being excluded from the protection under article 5 of the Washington Treaty (collective defence).¹⁸²

In many places neutrality means remaining outside a defensive alliance and being alone responsible for the defense of the country. The international legal term “neutrality” essentially means nonparticipation in the wars of other states. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not mean that a member state is obligated to support another member state which has been attacked and is reacting on the right of individual or collective self-defense as recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 5 states, “A member state will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking

forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”¹⁸³ Therefore, it would be possible for Switzerland as a member to help with other instruments than armed forces in order to restore and maintain peace in Europe, one of the goals of Swiss foreign policy. One possible way to establish such a possibility would be a special agreement with NATO, as it has with Russia and Ukraine. On the one hand, until now the Swiss Government has only said that it does not want to become a NATO member, because Switzerland can sufficiently contribute to the security and stability of Europe through its commitment in PfP. On the other hand, the information brochure of the DDPS states that NATO membership is “not compatible with neutrality since NATO membership includes the obligation to provide mutual assistance in case of war.”¹⁸⁴ Sooner or later membership and possible neutrality questions must be clarified, because NATO membership may become a Swiss option. For example in Zurich in the yearly meeting of the Swiss officers of Field Division 6, the German Brigade General Dieter Farwick expressed his wish that Switzerland join NATO by 2010.¹⁸⁵ A political debate of such problems is necessary, because in some areas an entry into NATO is an option for the future. A possible entry can be rejected at this point only if all positions are voiced.

¹⁸² The Federal Council, *Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland*, pp. 37-38.

¹⁸³ NATO, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 1998), p. 396.

¹⁸⁴ DDPS, *Swiss Neutrality*, p. 9.

¹⁸⁵ *Info F Div 6*, 1/2000, p. 18.

It is not an opportune time for Switzerland to become member of NATO. However, future Swiss participation in PfP looks promising as Martin Dahinden, Swiss minister at the mission in Brussels, wrote:

The Federal Council does not aim for NATO membership. This initial position is a strength and not a weakness for Swiss cooperation in the Partnership. For Switzerland, the Partnership is not a beauty contest in order to demonstrate its future ability as a member, but it has its own meaning. Therefore, Switzerland is totally interested in a good working partnership and is suited for still more active cooperation.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Martin Dahinden, "Ausbaufähige Kooperation Schweiz-Nato, Die Weiterentwicklung der Partnerschaft für den Frieden," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 1 October 1998. In the internet: [www.nato.int/pfp/ch/d981001a.htm] 10 March 2000.

VI. SWITZERLAND ON THE WAY TO THE EU OR FOREVER A SECRET MEMBER?

A. FROM EFTA TO THE SWISS VOTE TO JOIN THE EEA (6 DECEMBER 1992)

Switzerland has consistently adopted a European policy aimed at closer cooperation with the other nations of Western Europe. At each step it has been careful to ensure that this policy is firmly anchored in public law and intergovernmental agreements. It consequently followed the development of European integration in the supranational framework of the European Community (EC) with considerable skepticism. However, with the creation of the European Single Market and the changed circumstances which the ending of the Cold War brought about in the world political arena, Switzerland began to review its position. Together with its partners in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Switzerland entered into negotiations with the EC for the creation of a new European Economic Area (EEA). When this option was rejected by the Swiss people, Switzerland began the process of redefining its position, sector by sector, through bilateral negotiations.

1. From EFTA to the EEA: A Policy of Step by Step

In 1959 Switzerland decided to join EFTA, and in 1960 with Geneva as home to the EFTA secretariat, Switzerland signed the EFTA convention. Roland Mauerhofer called this act "the search for the lesser evil."¹⁸⁷ In Switzerland many people did not

¹⁸⁷ Roland Mauerhofer, "Die Suche nach dem kleinsten Uebel," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 3 January 2000.

endorse the establishment of a small foreign trade zone. Rather a lot of them wanted a counterpart to the European Economic Community (EEC), which was criticized as being too centralist and bureaucratic. Swiss skepticism was directed against the supranational structure and the political goals, which were judged to be incompatible with neutrality and sovereignty.¹⁸⁸ In 1959 the Federal Council decided to establish a Swiss mission in Brussels and accredited an ambassador to the EEC. In spring 1959, in order to bring more political thinking into a European policy completely dominated by the Trade Department, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Max Petitpierre, established a working group for integration questions. In the first meeting of the working group, he opened with the remark: "To date, we have always formulated what we do not want, but we never have clearly said what we actually want."¹⁸⁹ It was in the 1960s that Switzerland laid the foundations of a policy based on step-by-step pragmatism in the context of bilateral negotiations. The instrument of this pragmatic policy became the Integration Office, created in 1961.

In 1961 Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway announced their desire to join the EEC. As a consequence, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland also sent an association request. De Gaulle's veto of the British request stopped also the others from joining, but the Swiss Government never withdrew its request. The General Agreement

¹⁸⁸ Benedikt Tscharnet, "Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft," in: Alois Riklin, Hans Haug and Raymond Probst, eds., *Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik*, p. 476.

¹⁸⁹ Mauerhofer, Roland, "Die Suche nach dem kleinsten Uebel," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 3 January 2000.

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which Switzerland joined in 1966, improved the relationship between the EFTA and the EC states. Also, the Swiss step in 1963 to become a member of the European Council showed that they would not be passive in the policy of Europe. The explanation of the Swiss Federal Council shows how the Swiss Government saw its integration in Europe:

If the Council of Europe was originally intended to be the place in which a common European foreign policy would emerge, this ambition has faded into the background....Indeed, the manifold problems of European integration – including the political aspect – are also in the foreground of the Council of Europe. However, political discussion as such does not oppose any serious thoughts of political neutrality, in so far as they release no direct actions..¹⁹⁰

In 1972, Switzerland achieved one of its goals in the form of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EEC. While ensuring that Switzerland would not be left entirely out of the EC integration process, this agreement did not require relinquishing any sovereignty, and left open the possibility for the Swiss to negotiate additional agreements. The only institution the partners had in common was the Joint Committee, which was not endowed with any supranational power. This arrangement allowed Switzerland “to keep intact its neutrality, federalism and direct democracy,” as the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs wrote.¹⁹¹ Hence, 72.5 percent of the Swiss and all

¹⁹⁰ Christian Breitenmoser, *Sicherheit für Europa*, pp. 57-58.

¹⁹¹ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *Three Stages of Swiss Integration Policy*, [<http://www.europa.admin.ch/int/etaps.htm>] 11 January 2000.

cantons voted "yes" to this agreement.¹⁹² Over the next 20 years, Switzerland concluded over 100 special bilateral treaties with the EC. Most of them involved trade in goods. The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs characterized the seventies and eighties in the following way:

But concern was also spreading in the rest of the country, which was as much worried by the prospect of economic discrimination as by political isolation. The Federal Council however remained firmly convinced of the correctness of its three-pronged integration policy – based on cooperation in the context of EFTA, treaties with the EC, and bilateral relations with individual European states. The position of the Federal Council was that – for the three traditional reasons of Switzerland's neutrality, federalism, and direct democracy – there could be no question of full EC membership. At the same time however the government saw the need for an active integration policy, which assumed that salvation could only be found through an alternative "middle way." This option presented itself at the end of the 1980s, in the form of the European Economic Area (EEA).¹⁹³

The main part of the integration policy was strictly related to trade issues. Therefore, the Swiss agreed with the governmental policy. As far as the Swiss Government was concerned, there was never a comprehensive long term strategy.

2. Swiss "No" to the EEA: One Step Back?

When Austria, Norway, and Sweden began openly to discuss the possibility of joining the EC, Switzerland's growing fears of discrimination and ultimate isolation came to a head. This resulted in a more active policy on Europe, and efforts to ensure the

¹⁹² Benedikt Tschärner, "Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft," in: Alois Riklin, Hans Haug and Raymond Probst, eds., *Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik*, p. 480.

¹⁹³ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *Three Stages of Swiss Integration Policy*, [<http://www.europa.admin.ch/int/etaps.htm>] 11 January 2000.

compatibility of all new Swiss legislation with the laws of the EC, the so-called "Acquis Communautaire," which began in May 1988. In August of the same year, the Federal Council published its first major report on Europe, entitled *Switzerland's Position on the European Integration Process*. While advocating an integration policy based on sector-by-sector negotiations, the Federal Council recognized that times had changed, and admitted for the first time that full EC membership should not be categorically ruled out.¹⁹⁴ At the end of 1989, bargaining between the EC and EFTA, as well as among the EFTA partners, began. However, since the EEA agreement did not recognize the principle of the equality of the contractual partners in all areas, and in particular did not allow participation in legislative decision-making, the Federal Council considered this step as purely a transitional solution. Heinrich Christen characterized this move in a chapter called "Political Mistakes of the Federal Council."¹⁹⁵ He described the problems very clearly:

It [the Federal Council] made for the first time in November 1990 the fatal error of an internal connection between an EEA contract and European Union entry; because Swiss expectations of participation in the former could not be fulfilled, EU entry now moved into the foreground. This line of argument is made apparent by the statements of Federal Councilor Felber and Cotti, who since 1991/91 have publicly declared that they are more or less supporters of entry in the European Union. It becomes just as clear in this phase to the citizen that the social-democratic federal councilor Stich is both against an EEA contract as well as against European Union entry, and that the remaining federal councilors endorse

¹⁹⁴ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *Three Stages of Swiss Integration Policy*, [<http://www.europa.admin.ch/int/etaps.htm>] 11 January 2000.

¹⁹⁵ Heinrich Christen, "Die Schweiz – ein etwas anderer Weg nach Europa, Zur Integrationsgeschichte eines Aussenseiters," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30.12.1999.

the EEA contract more or less clearly. In addition, it is evident that the Federal Government does little to make the citizens aware of the necessity for deeper cooperation with the EU.¹⁹⁶

In Brussels on 22 October 1991, the Federal Councilors Felber and Delamuraz explained to Swiss journalists and diplomats, to the surprise of all, that the EEA contract was unbalanced and was suitable, therefore, only as a temporary solution before EU entry. According to them, the Federal Council had defined EU entry as a new goal, without committing itself to a date for the submission of the request. These statements were not, however, based on a Federal Council resolution; they reflected only the personal opinions of the two Federal Councilors. The result of these statements, after Switzerland signed the EEA accord in Porto on 2 May 1992, was its submission of a request for EU membership to Brussels at the end of May. The Swiss Government's "Eurolex" program, aimed at bringing Swiss law into line with that of the EC, was unveiled on 1 June. Less than six months later however, on 6 December 1992, the EEA option was rejected by 50.3 percent of Swiss voters, as well as by sixteen cantons. Over seventy-eight percent of the Swiss voted, much more than the usual average of 45 percent.¹⁹⁷

There are several reasons why the Swiss Government lost this campaign. The Federal Council had a modern information management on factual level. In contrast to it,

¹⁹⁶ Heinrich Christen, "Die Schweiz – ein etwas anderer Weg nach Europa, Zur Integrationsgeschichte eines Aussenseiters," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30 December 1999.

¹⁹⁷ Forschungsinstitut der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung, *VOX-Analyse, Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmung vom 6. Dezember 1992*, pp. 4 and 23.

the SVP, under the guidance of Christoph Blocher,¹⁹⁸ launched a “no” campaign aimed at emotional and identity questions. The opposition worked a half-year long on a large-scale advertisement campaign. In the summer, the opposing campaign was fully underway.

According to Heinrich Christ, three reasons led to the defeat of the Federal Council. First, the Federal Council talked about the EEA treaty and EU entry, which confused the Swiss people, and was exploited skillfully by the opposition. Secondly, the pro-campaign started much too late and too slow. Concerning the latter argument, he wrote:

The opponents likewise operated more successfully concerning values. They succeeded in stirring up a fear of loss of identity. In contrast to this, the proponents neglected the discussion regarding Swiss values and regarding necessary adjustments of Swiss institutions and models to the reality of the EU. This discussion is also today still hardly pursued.¹⁹⁹

To the question, “Why did 50.3% of the Swiss taking part in the referendum turn against the EEA, and 16 of the 23 cantons?” *The Economist* wrote:

It was partly a matter of culture-areas. All the German-speaking cantons except Basle (plus the Italian-speaking one) had majorities against the agreement; all the French-speaking ones were in favour, some by a big margin. Switzerland’s *Rösti-Graben* (its “friend-potato ditch”) has become a formidable barrier. The big Swiss-German cities all voted in favour, but were outvoted by the countryside and the small towns. In William Tell

¹⁹⁸ Christoph Blocher is more and more a person with great influence on Swiss people, because he is the head of the SVP in the canton Zurich on the one side, and on the other side he is the head of the CINS.

¹⁹⁹ Heinrich Christen, “Die Schweiz – ein etwas anderer Weg nach Europa, Zur Integrationsgeschichte eines Aussenseiters,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30 December 1999.

country, the little cantons in the mountain heartland, the view that this treaty was “not worthy of a free people” easily carried the day. But even in the *Unterland*, sophisticated and worldly cantons like Zurich and Aargau, the cities were beaten by the surrounding country. It is here that the Swiss belief in direct democracy – the system that enables people to decide any important issue by referendum, if necessary overriding federal or cantonal parliaments and local governments – is strongest.²⁰⁰

According to Nonhoff the adjustment to the juridical system of the domestic EU market was hardly comprehensible to most Swiss in such a brief time. The year 1989 was celebrated with a tribute to the 1939 general mobilization that aided Switzerland in getting through World War II on its own strength. The year 1991 was the one of the patriotic 700-year celebration of the Swiss Confederation, which suggested that Switzerland could be proud of its long democratic and independent tradition. In May 1992 the EEA contract was signed by the Federal Council, and ratified by the Parliament in October. In December there was already the ballot on the contract. The rapid succession of these events has been described as “a speed outrageous for conditions of Swiss concordance democracy.”²⁰¹

Five years after this ballot the leader of the opposition, Christoph Blocher, made a review. In his report he wrote that Switzerland was economically better off than other states in Europe five years after the EEA-no. According to him previous statements by Swiss officials for the case of the EEA refusal proved to be a gigantic mistake. According to Blocher, it was incomprehensible that so many prominent persons and

²⁰⁰ “Switzerland and the EC, The difference,” in: *The Economist*, 12 December 1992.

²⁰¹ Stephan Nonhoff, *In der Neutralität verhungern, Oesterreich und die Schweiz vor der europäischen Integration* (Münster: agenda Verlag, 1995), p. 131.

institutions uncritically misjudged the impact of the EEA contract. He supported the statements with numbers and facts. In conclusion he stated the future working direction of his grouping CINS and took a position clearly against EU membership:

Entry into the European Union would substantially limit the highest state property – liberty. For the Swiss, European Union integration would mean: the end of actual direct democracy in substantial interests, the transfer of political power of the people to the governments in Bern and Brussels, the renouncement of independent foreign and security policies, the renouncement of neutrality, European Union power politics in place of Swiss self-determination, restriction of free trade, rising unemployment, reduction of prosperity, income losses, higher interest on debts, higher interest on mortgage, additional and higher taxes, increase of the value added tax of 6.5% of at least 15%, renouncement of the Swiss franc and loss of national wealth, abolition of the border controls and the national immigration policy, and less security for the citizens.²⁰²

He maintained a position still today accepted by a great part of the Swiss population:

Independence, liberty, direct democracy, neutrality, and the welfare of the people are high values. They must be fought for without compromise. To have in the future political liberty, means also to secure economical liberty: an independent and sovereign Switzerland offers the chance, by retaining the political independence, to be more innovative and to be economically more efficient and more competitive than the European Union. The continuation of the proven free trade and the statement of the independence and neutrality are for Switzerland the only acceptable and successful ways.²⁰³

²⁰² Christoph Blocher, *Eine Standortbestimmung, 5 Jahre nach dem Nein der Schweiz zum Vertrag über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR)*, Ausführungen an der Pressekonferenz vom 5. Dezember 1997, *Hotel Bellevue, Bern*, [<http://www.blocher.ch/ewr.htm>] 18 September 1999.

²⁰³ Ibid.

In contradiction to these statements, the *Sonntagszeitung* wrote eight years after this ballot under the title “First of all more European than everyone thinks, Switzerland increasingly becomes with its laws an European Union colony”:

One can be so easily mistaken. As the Swiss people on 6 December 1992 said “no” to the EEA, Christoph Blocher was jubilant: “That is a confession of our political independence.” Seven years later, one could interpret this in a completely different way. The “no” did not bring much. It definitely did not bring political sovereignty. To the contrary, “We are more depend on foreign countries and not least on the EU,” diagnosed CS-Head Lukas Mühlemann last week in his disputation.²⁰⁴

Indeed, the Federal Council tried in the following years to adhere more and more closely to EU decisions, but the gap between the Swiss Government and the Swiss people was never closed.

3. The Steps After the Ballot about the EEA Contract

With the meeting of the European Council in Edingburg on 11 and 12 December 1992, the Swiss application for admission was put on ice, and the initiative for the next step was transferred to the government in Bern. Despite its non participation in the EEA, Switzerland tried to keep pace with the EU domestic market legislation. In February 1993, the Swiss Government submitted the so-called Swisslex drafts, with which former EEA agreements automatically should go into effect.

The conflict between the slower procedure in the integration policy, forced by the negative result of the EEA ballot, and the wording in the *White Paper on Switzerland's*

²⁰⁴ “Erstens europäischer, zweitens als man denkt, Rechtlich wird die Schweiz immer mehr zur EU-Kolonie – ob sie es will oder nicht,” in: *Sonntags Zeitung*, 9 January 2000.

Foreign Policy in the 90s, which postulated Switzerland's "contribution to international stability, primarily in Europe,"²⁰⁵ was recognized by the Federal Council and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The Federal Council wrote :

The Federal Council is aware of the differences of opinion among the citizens of our country on major foreign policy issues. It therefore deems it extremely important to involve all interested groups at the earliest possible stage in the process of opinion-building. Both UN membership and accession to the EEA were turned down in referendums. The Federal Council accepts these decisions, in the knowledge that, in a direct democracy, the people's decisions are a basic means of legitimizing government policy decisions. In adopting a bilateral and sectoral approach, the Federal Council is implementing the people's will. But the Federal Council also has the obligation, in the interests of the country and its future, to clearly establish its strategic foreign policy goals. The Federal Council has good reasons, despite the negative popular votes referred to earlier, to retain accession to the UN and to the EU as strategic objectives, even though it is well aware of how little sympathy many citizens currently feels for such a move.²⁰⁶

But as to how this strategic goal has to be concretely reached, the Federal Council is silent.

On 5 February 1993, the Federal Council sent the EU a proposal to open negotiations in fifteen sectors. On November 1993, the General Council of the EU agreed to begin negotiations in four sectors²⁰⁷ and considered two others.²⁰⁸ The negotiations were started in 1994. In 1998, the Federal Council mandated the Department

²⁰⁵ Thomas Köppel, *Zur EWR-Ablehnung*, Bulletin 1993 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheits- und Konfliktanalyse, 1994), p. 6.

²⁰⁶ The Federal Council, *White Paper on Switzerland's Foreign Policy in the 90s*, p. 36.

²⁰⁷ Road transport, free movement of people, research, free market access for agricultural products.

²⁰⁸ Technical trade barriers, public procurement.

of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Finance, in collaboration with all responsible offices, to prepare an integration report, which had to provide exhaustive information on the political, economic, and financial consequences of EU membership. It also had to make recommendations as to what measures were to be taken. On 11 December 1998, Switzerland and the EU concluded bilateral negotiations, four years after their beginning. On 21 June 1999, the bilateral agreements were signed in Luxembourg, and on 8 October the Swiss Parliament approved the seven agreements by an overwhelming majority.²⁰⁹

The initiatives that followed Swiss refusal of the EEA showed the uncertainty among the Swiss people. On 3 September 1993, the committee "Born on 7 December" presented the initiative "For our future in the heart of Europe" in order to launch a second ballot to join the EEA. They had collected 110,703 valid signatures. But in 1997 they withdrew the initiative. As a counterpoint the Lega and the Social Democrat Party presented the initiative "EC membership negotiations before the people," with 101,337 valid signatures. In 1997 this initiative was rejected by 73.9 percent of the Swiss. In 1995 the initiative "Yes to Europe,"²¹⁰ whose goal was membership in EU, was launched. One year later, it had collected 106,442 valid signatures.

B. SWISS-EU: INTEGRATION REPORT 1999

On 3 February 1999, Federal Councilor Cotti presented the 400 lateral Integration Report. He stressed that it did not concern the question of whether, but rather of when

²⁰⁹ For more information see: Integration Office, *Important Steps after the No to the EEA*, [<http://www.europa.admin.ch/e/int/suite.htm>] 11 January 2000.

negotiations of accession with the EU had to begin. First, a public integration debate needed to be held. The head of the Integration Office, Ambassador Spinner, called the 400 pages good material for a dialogue. The discussion should be led away from the emotional level onto the objective level. Therefore, the Federal Council wanted to strengthen the information.²¹¹ It therefore made available, beside 870,000 Swiss francs from the tiny budget, an additional 770,000 Swiss francs, and three additional jobs, first in order to inform the public about the bilateral treaties.²¹² Two months later the Integration Office stated, in order to be able to meet the increasing demands for information by the public, organizations and political parties, we want to create educational material and especially to establish contact with the media, teachers, organizations and parties, who should in turn continue to carry the information to the public.²¹³ A study, concluded at the end of 1999, showed that the majority of the population was still not informed.²¹⁴

In the first 300 pages of the report the EU was explained in full detail. At each point afterwards it raised questions concerning the consequences Switzerland entry into EU, signing the EEA contract, bilateral treaties, or the status quo. The second part

²¹⁰ The goal of this initiative is, to force the Federal Council to start the negotiations with the EU for an EU membership.

²¹¹ The Federal Council never gave guidelines or presented a strategy how it wanted to strengthen the information.

²¹² "Ja zu Europa – aber alles zu seiner Zeit," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 February 1999.

²¹³ Integrationsbüro EDA/EVD, *Schweiz – Europäische Union, Fact Sheets* (Bern: Bundespresse, Mai 1999), p. 7.

²¹⁴ Karl W Haltiner and others, *Sicherheit 1999, Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend*, pp. 66-67.

concentrated on the large national political questions: independence, welfare, security, and foreign policy. The second part also addressed expressed questions of Swiss citizens.²¹⁵

The report takes no sides. It presents advantages and disadvantages, but offers no strategy for the future. Many questions remain unanswered or do not reflect the sentiment of the Swiss public. For example some stated “Key Questions” are

- Can the general interests of Switzerland be better preserved and promoted if Switzerland is an EU Member or if it remains outside the EU?
- How can Swiss freedom of action and self-determination be preserved?
- How can security best be assured for each Swiss citizen?²¹⁶

The conclusion of the Federal Council to these questions starts as following:

The answers to these key questions are vitally important for the future of our country. Each Swiss citizen must determine those answers for himself or herself. The integration report provides a working basis for doing so. The Federal Council, acting in the interest of our country and with internal political support, is resolutely determined to pursue the route which in its view best serves the public interest....The Federal Council hopes that the public debate about Swiss integration policy will be intense.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ For the whole report see: Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Schweiz – Europäische Union, Integrationsbericht 1999*, (Bern: Bundespresse, 1999). For a short summary see: *Switzerland – European Union, Integration Report 1999*, [<http://www.europa.admin.ch/e/int/ri-resume.htm>] 11 January 2000.

²¹⁶ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, pp. 401-404.

²¹⁷ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, p. 404.

In the chapter on social politics, among other issues there is addressed maternity leave. The Swiss law would have to be adapted in order to correspond to the EU law.

The comment of the Federal Council in the integration report reads:

The introduction of maternity insurance and paid maternity leave, although not currently in effect in Switzerland as required by European law, is on the Swiss political agenda.²¹⁸

In contrast to this statement stands the result of a recent proposal for a new Federal law on the maternity insurance. On 13 June 1999, the proposal was rejected by 61.0 percent of Swiss citizens.²¹⁹

Regarding the Swiss permanent neutrality the report comes to the conclusion that EU membership would be compatible with the status of permanent neutrality.²²⁰ Regarding the political rights of the Swiss to start a referendum or an initiative, the Federal Council confesses that there exists specific point of contention, because European Common law overrides the constitution or law of a country. A study was conducted by the Europe Institute in Zurich in order to prove that Swiss citizens still have political rights even after an EU entry. They examined the ballots between 1 January 1993 and 30 June 1998 and came to the conclusion that under 15 percent of the referendums were affected by the European Common law.²²¹ As Dietrich Schindler wrote, these facts and

²¹⁸ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, p. 97.

²¹⁹ *Results of the ballot, 13 June 1999*, [<http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/19990613/det458.html>] 20 February 2000.

²²⁰ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, pp. 380-388.

²²¹ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, p. 332.

figures are not the most important factor for the Swiss. There is a certain special Swiss feeling, which has to be understood. He wrote in his political evaluation concerning the political rights of the Swiss citizen:

The before mentioned data point out the fact that the effects of European Union membership are minimal on direct democracy....Crucially for the citizen is less the number of the ballots than rather the question, on which affairs they could not decide any longer in the case of the European Union membership. From importance for them might be in particular that they no more, as today, would have the possibility to decide on practically each national acting either or of using themselves by means of referendum or initiative for causing a popular vote. The Swiss need to be able to have a say in all national decisions has older roots than the referendum and the people initiative.²²²

One of Christoph Blocher's arguments against the EEA treaty in 1992 was the increase of the value added tax from 6.5 percent to 15 percent. In the *Integration Report 1999* the Federal Council wrote:

However, it is certain that the normal beginning of the value added tax would have to be increased to 15%²²³....Due to the European Union entry the inevitable increase of value added tax to 15% would bring to the federation on the one hand substantial additional receipts.²²⁴....The measures for partial compensation would have to take place in economics and social compatibly. In particular, the rearrangement effects of fiscal charges would have to be submitted...to a thorough examination.²²⁵

²²² Dietrich Schindler, *EU-Mitgliedschaft und direkte Demokratie, Das Ausmass der Einbusse an direkter Demokratie*, [<http://www.europa.admin.ch/d/pub/dos/direktedemoc.htm>] September 1999.

²²³ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, p. 134.

²²⁴ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, p. 375.

²²⁵ Schweizerischer Bundesrat, *Integrationsbericht 1999*, p. 376.

Still seven years later the Federal Council presented no ideas or solutions about the procedure for compensation, which will make it difficult to get the Swiss citizen to say "yes" to EU membership.

The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* criticized the report, because it only presented facts and figures and never made an evaluation of important questions such as "How important are the political rights?" or "What is still important for the Swiss federalism?" and "What must be guaranteed?"²²⁶

The *Integration Report 1999* made many important points, but the average citizen will never read this comprehensive 400-page report. There exists no summary or public information brochure as the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sports provided with its *Report on the Security Policy of Switzerland Security through Cooperation*.²²⁷

C. THE BILATERAL TREATIES

In 1992 after the Swiss rejected the EEA Treaty *The Guardian* wrote, quoting Franz Andriessen, the EC's Foreign Affairs Commissioner, who negotiated the EEA:

A country that has chosen isolation cannot expect that we can do in a bilateral accord what they have rejected on the multilateral level.²²⁸

²²⁶ "Keimfreie Politik," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 February 1999.

²²⁷ See: The Federal Council, *Security through Cooperation, Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland of 7 June 1999*; The Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protections, and Sports, *An Overview of the Report 2000 on Swiss Security Policy*; The Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protections and Sports, *Security through Cooperation, An Information Brochure on the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on Security Policy of Switzerland*.

²²⁸ John Carvel, "Swiss reject European-wide customs free zone," in: *The Guardian*, 7 December 1992.

The reality was different, the negotiations on bilateral treaties started in 1994 and the result was that they were signed in 1999 in Luxembourg. The treaty consists of seven sub-treaties: research, public procurement markets, technical barriers to trade, agriculture, civil aviation, overland transports, and free movement of people.²²⁹

On 21 May 2000 the Swiss have to say “yes” or “no” to the bilateral treaties. The Swiss Democrats and the Lega dei Ticinesi collected about 70,000 signatures.²³⁰ By presenting their signatures they said that the EU interventions against Austria show that the EU does not respect the sovereignty of its members.²³¹

In January 2000, a study of the GfS-Research Institute showed that 63 percent of the Swiss would say “yes” to the bilateral treaties.²³² After the announced bilateral sanctions of the EU member-states against Austria another study showed that the possible “yes” votes went back to 57 percent.²³³ After this study two major political parties, the FDP and CVP, both of which say “yes” to EU membership, believe that the Swiss people must be kept more informed. The chief of the opposite party, the SVP, Ueli Maurer said: “For more than 10 years we have been explaining that the EU is undemocratic. Today we

²²⁹ For more information see: *Fact Sheets 200, the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the European Union, report on the agreements and companion measures, with explanation*, [<http://www.europa.admin.ch/e/int/fs2000htm>] 1 March 2000.

²³⁰ “Mobilmachung gegen die bilateralen Verträge,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 February 2000.

²³¹ “Rund 70,000 Unterschriften gesammelt,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 3 February 2000. [<http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/000203/000203c20.html>] 3 February 2000.

²³² *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29 January 2000.

²³³ “Haider-Effekt gefährdet Bilaterale. Umfrage zeigt: Die EU-Sanktionen gegen Oesterreich geben den Gegnern der Abstimmungsvorlage Aufwind,” in: *Sonntags-Zeitung*, 6 February 2000.

see the proof.” In contrast to this the Institution for the Promotion of Economics, responsible for the pro-campaign of the bilateral treaties, says that the Swiss citizen can differentiate. He knows that the bilateral treaties are economic contracts and have nothing to do with politics.²³⁴ Two days before the published study in February 2000, according to a statement of the Federal Councilor Pascal Couchepin, the Federal Council did not believe that the bilateral EU sanctions against Austria had an influence on the Swiss bilateral treaties.²³⁵

How important will the information of the Federal Council be, is shown by the study *Security 1999*. By presenting the study, Professor Haltiner pointed out:

Altogether the bilateral agreement at the urn might have a good change of being accepted. However the majority of the people does not know exactly what it entails....Substantial clearing-up work remains for its execution.²³⁶

On the side of the Swiss Government there exists already a lot of material such as brochures, information disks and CDs, but the Swiss citizen has to order them.²³⁷

The ballot in 1992 on the EEA treaty and the ballot in 2000 about the bilateral treaties show certain parallels: The strategic goal of EU membership is still as or even

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ “Couchepin sieht keine Probleme – Parteien bereiten sich vor,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 4 February 2000. [<http://www.newswindow.ch/artikel000204/000204c22.html>]. 4 February 2000. On the other hand, his colleague, Federal Councilor Deiss, believes damage for the bilateral treaties. See: “Deiss befürchtet Schaden für Bilaterale,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7 February 2000.

²³⁶ “Gemäss Bericht “Sicherheit 99” gewinnt Oeffnung Anhänger,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 17 December 1999. [<http://www.newswindow.ch/artikel/991217/991217c18.html>] 17 December 1999.

²³⁷ Order address: [<http://www.europa.admin.ch>].

more important as the bilateral treaties. If one follows the remarks of the Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Federal Councilor Deiss, then bilateral contracts form only one transition for a later UN or EU entry. In a interview in the *Aargauer Zeitung* he stressed that Switzerland had been set “too strongly on the bilateral rail.” Politically in the recent years Switzerland failed to attach a link with multilateral organizations like the UN or the EU, and has itself concentrated on the bilateral treaties. He does not see a neutrality problem, if Switzerland cooperates more directly with international organizations. It is necessary to engage dynamically the instrument of the neutrality.²³⁸ One of the reasons that the Swiss Government lost the ballot in 1992, was the confusion between the EEA Treaty and the EU membership and also the loss of a real strategy.²³⁹

D. THE SWISS GOALS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLICY FROM THE 20TH CENTURY TO THE 21ST CENTURY

According to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs the defined goal of the Federal Council’s European integration policy is to prevent Switzerland’s political isolation, economic discrimination, and cultural provincialisation within Europe, while strengthening Switzerland’s competitive position. The long-term European integration policy of the Federal Council can, according to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, be summarized as follows:

²³⁸ “Deiss: Schweiz hat zu stark auf bilaterale Schiene gesetzt,” in: *Blue Windows News*, 20 January 2000. [<http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/000120/000120c12.html>.] 20 January 2000.

²³⁹ For more informations about the bilateral treaties (history, content) see also the special dossiers of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Tages Anzeiger*.

Switzerland will best defend its long-term interests by participating fully and with equal rights in the European integration process. Only full membership of the European Union will give Switzerland a say in the decision-making process that is shaping the political, economic and cultural future of Europe. In spite of Switzerland remaining outside the EU, many of the Union's decisions affect Switzerland in much the same way as they affect the member states.²⁴⁰

Several times the head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the strategic goal of the Federal Council still was membership in the UN and the EU. In an interview in the *Basler Zeitung*, he said that after concluding bilateral contracts the next step might be the EU entry of Switzerland.²⁴¹ In another place he stressed that, on the one hand, an EU entry of Switzerland would cause costs and adjustments of the institutions; on the other hand, however, Switzerland would get rights to share in decision making, influence and thus at so-called "plus on sovereignty with contents."²⁴²

In February 2000, the announced bilateral sanctions of the EU member states against the Austrian government have a certain influence on the Swiss discussion about EU membership. The reactions show what a part of the Swiss population, probably a large part, thinks about the EU, and this thinking is not compatible with the actions of the Federal Council. Andreas Durisch wrote an article entitled "Caution with sanctions

²⁴⁰ Federal Departement of Foreign Affairs, *Integration Policy*, [www.eda.admin.ch/site/aussenpolitik/europ.html] 11 January 2000.

²⁴¹ "Der Bundesrat hält an seinem strategischen EU-Ziel fest," in : *Basler Zeitung*, 29 October 1999.

²⁴² "Bündesrätliches Plädoyer für eine aussenpolitische Oeffnung," in: *Blue Windows News*, 21 November 1999. [http://www.newswindows.ch/artikel/991121/991121c07.html] 21 November 1999, and "Souveränitätsverzicht als Zeichen der Stärke," in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 23 November 1999.

against Austria – the democracy understanding of the EU and the effects – on Switzerland.” He stated:

But sanctions, imposed against our neighboring country, are justified actually only if the democratic legal order is really in danger....The political success [Joerg Haiders’ party] is also the result of a policy, which is based more exactly on the concerns and fears of the population...if now the Crème of the European Union politicians proceeds against Austria with the emotional feeling of Greenpeace activists, then a Swiss citizen has to be concerned about the European community’s understanding of the word “democracy.” How much is national identity and sovereignty worth to them?...The European Union sanctions against Austria are poison with a long-term effect for the European integration discussion here in this country.²⁴³

Similar passages could be read in the liberal *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. Even this newspaper pointed out that the national identity, guaranteed in the EU treaty, probably lost its value.²⁴⁴

Most of the Swiss steps in the past were concentrated on the economic part. More and more the EU has to be seen as an organization with its three pillars: the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Cooperation in the Spheres of Justice and Home Affairs. In the reports of the Swiss Government, the “Common Foreign and Security Policy”²⁴⁵ is almost neglected, but in the future it will have a greater

²⁴³ “Vorsicht mit Sanktionen gegen Oesterreich, Andreas Durisch über das Demokratieverständnis der EU und Auswirkungen auf den Kleinstaat Schweiz,” in: *Sonntags-Zeitung*, 6 February 2000.

²⁴⁴ “Oesterreich – in Quarantäne – regierbar,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7 February 2000. “Social Democrats and Power Changes,” in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online*, “English Window,” 7 February 2000. [http://www.nzz.ch/online/04_english/editorials/edit_ab000204socialdemocrats.htm] 7 February 2000.

²⁴⁵ For more information see: Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 70-76.

and greater impact on a possible Swiss EU membership.²⁴⁶ For example in the *Integration Report 1999* the Federal Council briefly wrote:

If in the future an EU security system should work satisfactorily, offering as much security as the Swiss have with their system of neutrality, then Switzerland could abandon its neutrality in favor of the new security system.²⁴⁷

For the future, it will be important for the Swiss Government to look at the development of the EU and to analyze this development regarding possible consequences for a possible Swiss EU membership.

The information of the Federal Council today and in the future will be important to gaining Swiss EU membership. Already in 1993 Jacques Hürlimann wrote:

If the Federal Council regards the European Union entry further as a goal of the Swiss integration policy, then the federal state government must also take steps toward this goal. It is not sufficient only to determine, for the near future the chances for an entry appeared small, and Switzerland is too little prepared for this fundamental political step. This step must be prepared by systematic information. It needs also a schedule for the entry to the community, from which clearly follows, which concrete intermediate objectives in the fixed stages have to be achieved; the schedule in the report on foreign policy has too little meaning.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ See also: The Federal Council, *Integration Report 1999*, pp. 202-208.

²⁴⁷ The Federal Council, *Integration Report 1999*, p. 381.

²⁴⁸ Jacques Hürlimann, *Negative Auswirkungen des Nein zum EWR im weiteren Bereich der Sicherheitspolitik*, Bulletin 1993 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung der ETH Zürich, 1994), p. 13, [http://www.fsk.ethy.ch/publ/bulletin/bulle_93/bull_93.htm] 10 October 1999.

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VII. CONCLUSION

Regarding the history of Switzerland, over every century until today the main key points can be seen in democracy, neutrality, acceptance of minorities, individual and political rights, freedom, sovereignty and independence. From 1291 to 2000 Switzerland had time to improve its constitution. From 1291 until today the political organization and the political system grew. Thanks to this history, Switzerland was able to avoid war for more than 100 years. Thanks to this history, Switzerland was able to integrate in the same country several languages, several minorities, and several cultures.

Neutrality is one element in this history. In the beginning, Switzerland wanted to be neutral in order to keep its independence. Later, neutrality also gave Switzerland the possibility to offer good offices in diplomacy to foreign parties. This was one of the reasons that Geneva became a "world peace center." But the sense of neutrality also led Switzerland to a certain isolationism. After World War II the first steps were made to open the Swiss policy. Up until now the movement has fluctuated – going up and down.

Switzerland conducts its relations with the rest of the world not only bilaterally, but also on a multilateral level. In the context of globalization and the increasingly cross-border nature of problems, cooperation within international organizations becomes more and more important. Switzerland, together with the Holy See and a few small states of the Pacific region, is not a member of the United Nations. In accordance with a referendum held in 1986 Switzerland refrained from membership on its own initiative and held the status of observer. However, it is a full member of all United Nations

specialized agencies and of many other international organizations outside the UN system, is one of the most important financial contributors to the UN, and makes available military observer, military units, and experienced civilian personnel.

Although the Swiss people rejected the initiative to become a member of the UN and rejected the creation of a blue helmet battalion, the Swiss Government increased and optimized its commitments all over the world, in the long tradition of the Swiss good offices. The reason for this is that the Swiss public never said “no” to these engagements. In 1998 the Federal Council showed the Parliament in a report what Switzerland was really doing in support of the United Nations. This report received little public notice, and thus the information of the public remained at a low level.

The new Swiss initiative to join the UN by 2003 will succeed if the Swiss Government explains to the public what Switzerland did over the last years.

The decision to become a member of the OSCE is an example of how Switzerland took more steps forward because the goals of the OSCE were in line with the main key points of Swiss history.

Starting from the middle of the 1950s the Federal Council took a rather skeptical attitude toward a European security conference, but did not express a categorical “no.” After the Berlin and the Cuban missile crises, the Federal Council adopted a careful waiting position, which then, at the beginning of the multilateral preliminaries in 1972, changed to very active cooperation.

Until 1972, the attitude of Switzerland in relation to a European security conference remained rather skeptical. Its basic attitude shifted before the beginning of the

conference to an active commitment to the process. The CSCE process became a vehicle to activate Swiss foreign policy. Until 1975 the development of the Swiss attitude to the CSCE showed the tension between a restrictively interpreted neutrality and a dynamic foreign policy, which occupied the Swiss politicians and the public at that time. The same phenomenon can be discerned again today, in that neutrality is not judged more restrictively by the government.

Already at the beginning of the 1970s the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which reached a high point in the phase of the détente with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, represented a mayor challenge for Switzerland. Its active participation can be called an outstanding element of the Swiss foreign policy of the 1970s. The Swiss project for a system of peaceful settlement of disputes formed thereby the main focus of Swiss conference diplomacy. The European conference offered Switzerland a favorable opportunity to obtain a re-acknowledgment of its neutrality, which was reconfirmed at Istanbul in 1999.

The presidium of the OSCE in 1996 did not introduce a turn in Swiss foreign policy. With the assumption of the OSCE presidency, Switzerland continued its traditional commitment in the context of the Helsinki process. However, that year strengthened Switzerland, both relating to domestic affairs and with regard to foreign policy. Thanks to OSCE engagement, Switzerland gained a great experience in diplomacy and field activities.

The history of Swiss participation in PfP is similar to the history of its OSCE membership. Already in the Presentation Document the Swiss Government wrote that

Switzerland was committed to permanent and armed neutrality, and that Switzerland's decision to participate in PfP was based on the desire to expand its co-operation for the promotion of security and peace with partner states, along the lines and in the spirit of its traditional policy of good offices and complementary to its engagement in the OSCE and in the Council of Europe.²⁴⁹ The Swiss people agreed on this engagement because it was in line with Swiss tradition.

Because in 1992 the Swiss people were against the EEA agreement, it took another three years after NATO's establishment of PfP before Switzerland joined the program. The Federal Council was careful in taking further steps toward European integration. History shows that with PfP participation the Federal Council was too careful, that it did not take into account that PfP was in line with Swiss tradition.

Starting in 1997, Switzerland grew, step-by-step, in PfP. The Swiss PfP participation shows that Switzerland was strong in technique and education. The Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research started with ISN, which also became part of the NATO homepage, and presented every year new techniques and studies. Geneva became one of the education centers. This development is going on as Switzerland wants to establish in Geneva a third center for the democratic control of armed forces.

Although Switzerland decided not to take part in military exercises of a defensive character, the Swiss Armed Forces are becoming, with the participation in PARP, more and more interoperable. Step-by-step the Swiss Armed Forces gain experience in

²⁴⁹ The Federal Council, *Presentation Document of Switzerland for the Partnership for Peace*.

interoperability by participating in KFOR, working together with IFOR in Bosnia, and through exercises "in the spirit of PfP."

Switzerland probably will not become member of NATO in the coming years. On several occasions, the Swiss Government declared that Switzerland did not wish to become a member of NATO, but desired to be a full partner in PfP, EAPC, and PARP. But it is important that the Swiss Government analyzes NATO membership and its consequences. In the parliament, in the armed forces, and among the Swiss people it must become clear why the Swiss Government is against such membership. As a part of the government's information strategy, it is critical that this dialogue be led.

The chapter about the relationship between the EU and Switzerland is one of the chapters in Swiss history that shows the greatest gap between the Swiss Government and the Swiss people, but it also shows how Switzerland found a way to live together with the Europeans without giving up the Swiss system of neutrality, political rights, and Swiss integrity. But this chapter also shows that Switzerland is on its way toward defining a new role for itself in Europe. The EU is no longer only an economic organization; it has increasingly become an organization concerned with aspect of security as written in the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.

When in 1959 Switzerland decided to join the EFTA, it started an economic policy of moving closer toward the European community, but always with skepticism against European supranational structures. The foundation of a policy based on step-by-step pragmatism in the context of bilateral negotiations started in the 1960s. The

economic basis is one of the first steps in security thinking, and therefore was always important for the little country of Switzerland.

De Gaulle's veto against Great Britain's entry to the EC also ended Switzerland's campaign to enter the EC, but Switzerland never withdrew its demand. The next step to improve the relationship between EC and EFTA states was Switzerland's entry into the GATT in 1966. This economic step was also seen as a political step, along with the in 1963 membership of the European Council. These two steps show Switzerland's wish to cooperate in and with Europe, always with regard to Swiss sovereignty and Swiss neutrality. The next economic step followed in 1972 with the Free Trade Agreement and over 100 special bilateral treaties with the EC, which also complicated the system.

With the creation of the EEA, there came a break. Because the EU did not recognize in the EEA the equal rights of every EFTA state, and did not allow the participation in the legislative decision-making, on the one hand the Swiss Government came to the conclusion that, after positive Swiss decision to the EEA, EU membership would be best for the Swiss country. On the other hand, the Swiss people came to the conclusion that an EEA agreement was against the "Swiss thinking on political rights," as well as EU membership, and therefore they said "no" in the historic ballot of 1992. The decision of this ballot had a great influence on several other ballots. It also increased the influence of the SVP and the grouping CINS. This ballot also showed that the SVP and the CINS used an information strategy, which brought the information to the people and could persuade them. Since this ballot there has been a permanent information flow from this side to the Swiss people.

In spite of the Swiss decision in 1992, the Swiss Government declared EU membership as strategic goal. However, it declared the bilateral negotiations and the following bilateral treaties as primarily goals to realize. An EU entry would become opportune when the time is ripe.

The next steps towards EU were two Swiss reports: *White Paper on Switzerland's Policy in the 90s with the annex of Swiss Neutrality*, and the *Integration Report 1999*. The first report showed the will of the Swiss Government to cooperate in Europe, to open the Swiss policy, and to join the EU in declaring it as compatible with Swiss neutrality. The second report, the *Integration Report 1999*, showed the activities of the EU and the Swiss possibilities in the EU. Although every pillar of the EU was explained, the main aspects were focused on the economic side. For the future, it will be important for the Swiss Government to see the EU in its full extension and to develop a future Swiss strategy in getting the Swiss people to accept the goals of the government, otherwise the opposition with its permanent information will win every ballot, and the Swiss reputation in Europe will decrease.

With the bilateral negotiations starting in 1994 the Swiss Government went back to the typical Swiss step-by-step policy. As before, these negotiations were concentrated on economics, and the ballot in 2000 will show if the Swiss people will take another economic step towards Europe.

Taking everything into account, as a country with an old stable system, Switzerland can be proud of its work. It has greatly contributed to worldwide, European, as well as domestic security. However, this work gives the impression of a certain

mysticism. It will be the challenge for the Swiss Government to develop together with the Swiss people a vision for the 21st century. But it will be also a challenge for the Swiss Government to establish long-term, mid-term, and short-term goals integrated into a timetable within a grand strategy. To persuade the Swiss people of the government's grand strategy, the Federal Council has to develop an information strategy. Then Switzerland will have a great deal to offer what indicated Vladimir Petrovsky, the head of the UN in Geneva, answering the question "Could Switzerland offer something to the United Nations?":

Yes, Switzerland is one of the oldest and most stable democracies of the world. At the end of the 20th century the democratic system of government expands throughout the world. In Switzerland four different cultures live close together, at peace with one another. And the proportion of inhabitants without Swiss passports stands about twenty per cent. Here Switzerland has a model function.²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ "Bern bezahlt und entscheidet nicht mit," in: *Tages Anzeiger*, 9 September 1999.

APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation in English	Meaning in English	Abbreviation in German	Meaning in German
AUCON/KFOR	Austrian Contingent/Kosovo Force	---	---
CAX	Computer Assisted Exercise	---	---
CDE	Cooperative Determination Exercise	---	---
CENCOOP	Central European Nations Cooperation	---	---
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy	GASP	Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik
CINS	Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland	AUNS	Aktion für eine unabhängige und neutrale Schweiz
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force	---	---
CPX	Command Post Exercise	---	---
CSBM	Confidence- and Security Building Measures	VSBM	Vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildende Massnahmen
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe	KSZE	Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa
DDPS	The Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports	VBS	Departement Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport
DFAE	The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs	EDA	Eidgenössisches Departement für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten
---	Christian Democratic People's Party	CVP	Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei
---	Free Economic Democratic Party	FDP	Freiheitlich-demokratische Partei
EAPC	European Atlantic Partnership Council	EAPC	Europäischer Atlantik Partnerschaftsrat
EC	European Community	EG	Europäische Gemeinschaft
EEC	European Economic Community	EWG	Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
EEA	European Economic Area	EWR	Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum
ETC	European Security Policy Training Course	---	---
ETHZ	Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich	ETHZ	Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
EU	European Unity	EU	Europäische Union
FERN	Free Elections Radio Network	---	---
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation	FSK	Forum für Sicherheitskooperation
FTA	Free Trade Agreement	FHA	Freihandelsabkommen

GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	GATT	Allgemeines Zoll- und Handelsabkommen
GCSP	Geneva Center for Security Policy	GZS	Genfer Zentrum für Sicherheitspolitik
GICHD	Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining	IZMH	Internationales Zentrum für Humanitäre Minenräumung
HA	Humanitarian assistance	---	---
JHA	Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs	ZJIP	Zusammenarbeit in der Justiz- und Innenpolitik
IFOR	Implementation Force	---	---
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action	---	---
ISN	International and Security Network	ISN	Internationales Sicherheitsnetzwerk
IPP	Individual Partnership Program	IPP	Individuelles Partnerschaftsprogramm
IRC	International Red Cross	IKRK	Internationales Rotes Kreuz
ITC	International Training Course in Security Policy	---	---
KFOR	Kosovo Force	---	---
KMV	Kosovo Verification Mission		
MACC	Mine Action Coordination Center	---	---
MFBR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions	---	---
MINURSO	Missions des Nations Unies Pour le Referendum au Sahara occidental	---	Mission der Vereinten Nationen für die Organisation eines Referendums in der Westsahara
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republik of the Congo	---	Mission der Vereinten Nationen in der demokratischen Republik Kongo
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council	NACC	Nordatlantikkoooperationsrat
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	---	Nordatlantikpakt-Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organization	---	---
NISC	New Issues in Security Course		
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (UN mission in Korea)	---	Neutrale Ueberwachungskommission in Korea
OEEC	Organization for European and Economical Collaboration	---	---
OPCW	International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	---	---
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	OSZE	Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in

			Europa
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights	BDIR	Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte
PARP	Planning and Review Process	---	Planung- und Ueberprüfungsprozess
PfP	Partnership for Peace	PfP	Partnerschaft für den Frieden
PSO	Peace Support Operation	---	Friedenserhaltende Operationen
SFOR	Supporting Force	---	---
SMU	Swiss Medical Unit in Namibia in 1989-1990	---	---
SPN	Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network	---	Schweizerische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Netzwerk
---	Swiss People's Party	SVP	Schweizerische Volkspartei
---	Swiss Socialist Party	SPS	Schweizerisch-sozialistische Partei
UN	United Nations	UNO	Vereinte Nationen
UNDP	United Nations Development Program	---	Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees	---	Uno Hochkommissariat für Flüchtlinge
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission	---	Beobachtungsmission der Vereinten Nationen in Iraq-Kuwait
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	---	Beobachtermission der Vereinten Nationen in Georgien
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	---	Interim Administration der Vereinten Nationen in Kosovo
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Croatia	---	Beobachtermission der Vereinten Nationen in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Organization Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	---	Beobachtermission der Vereinten Nationen in Tajikistan
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force	---	Schutztruppe der Vereinten Nationen (Bosnien-Herzegowina)
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission	---	Sonderkommission der Vereinten Nationen
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia	---	Unterstützungseinheit der Vereinten Nationen für die Uebergangszeit
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East	---	Ueberwachungsmission der Vereinten Nationen im Mittleren Osten
WEU	Western European Union	WEU	Westeuropäische Union

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